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Toward a New Approach to Disability Law
David A. Weisbacht
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that a new approach to the laws govern-
ing disabilities is needed. Existing approaches, largely based on
the "social model" of disabilities are unable to answer basic ques-
tions, such as the extent to which resources should be devoted to
the disabled. The Article argues that basing disability policy di-
rectly on welfarist theories of distributive justice offers a better
approach and begins the task of developing what such an ap-
proach would look like. Under a welfarist approach, policy to-
ward the disabled depends on how a given disability affects the
well-being of an individual. Under reasonable assumptions, re-
distribution toward individuals with disabilities is desirable, but
the extent and form depends on a variety of factors. If disabilities
are observable, adjustments to the income tax schedule should be
preferred. If disabilities are not observable, commodity taxes or
in-kind provision of certain goods (such as accommodations) may
be desirable to solve screening problems. In this case, inefficient
over supply of these goods is likely to be optimal. Finally, to the
extent that needs of the disabled are public goods, supply of such
goods may be desirable (even if disabilities are observable).
INTRODUCTION
Almost all modern studies of disabilities laws use the so-
called social model.' The social model claims that disabilities are
t Walter J. Blum Professor and Kearney Director of the Program in Law and Eco-
nomics, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank participants at workshops and
seminars at the University of Chicago, Harvard, Berkeley, and Stanford for comments.
1 The literature on the social model is large and a short summary cannot do justice
to the variety of subtleties and nuances in the model. The origins of the social model date
back at least to Saad Nagi's work in the 1960's. See Saad Z. Nagi, Disability and Rehabil-
itation: Legal, Clinical, and Self-Concepts and Measurement (Ohio State 1969); Saad Z.
Nagi, Some Conceptual Issues in Disability and Rehabilitation, in Marvin B. Sussman,
ed, Sociology and Rehabilitation 100 (Am Sociological Assn 1965). It was developed expli-
citly for the first time in The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and
The Disability Alliance Discuss: Fundamental Principles of Disability (London 1975),
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caused by the constructed environment, that they are socially
caused, and that it is society's ethical or moral duty to change
that environment to provide equal access and equal functioning
to all its members. To make this claim, the social model combines
a causal argument and a normative argument. The causal claim
is that disability is caused by social arrangements rather than
individual medical conditions. Individuals have impairments or
traits of various sorts. The social model argues that it is the so-
cial environment, the organization of society, that causes the
traits to limit functioning, thereby causing a disability. The ex-
ample almost always used to illustrate the idea is an individual
in a wheelchair who cannot access a building because of the
stairs. The social model claims that it is the choice to construct
the building with stairs rather than the individual impairment
that causes the limited functioning or disability.
The normative claim is that disability should be addressed
as a matter of discrimination. Disability is like race or sex, a dif-
ference that should not matter. Anything that causes a disability
to matter is, therefore, defined as discrimination, and, subject to
certain limitations, society is said to have an obligation to elimi-
nate it. The Americans with Disabilities Act 2 ("ADA") is the
crowning achievement of the social model and is the subject of
most of the disabilities literature since its enactment in 1990. 3
Although the focus on discrimination is important because of
the real and potentially subtle effects of animus and statistical
discrimination, this Article will argue that the social model and
discrimination theory are inadequate bases for a general theory
of disability. The key problem is that these theories do not direct-
ly address scarcity and, therefore, conflate issues of distributive
justice-how much society should allocate to individuals with
available at <http://www.leeds.ac.ukldisability-studies/archiveukUPIAS/fundamental%
20principles.pdf> (last visited Jan 15, 2009). Michael Oliver is viewed as central in bring-
ing the model to a wider audience. See Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A
Sociological Approach (Macmillan 1990). A forerunner in the legal literature is Jacobus
tenBroek. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law
of Torts, 54 Cal L Rev 841 (1966). Mary Crossley was one of the first to use the social
model in the legal literature. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 Notre
Dame L Rev 621 (1999). For additional discussion of the social model in the legal litera-
ture, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va L Rev 397
(2000); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L J 1 (2004); Mary
Crossley, Reasonable Accommodations as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination
Project, 35 Rutgers L J 861 (2004); Michael A. Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 (2004).
2 42 USC § 12101-12213 (2006).
3 The literature studying the effects of the ADA is vast. For a partial list of papers,
see Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 3 n 2 (cited in note 1).
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different traits-with issues of biased or inappropriate behavior.
Even if we were setting up society from a blank slate and entire-
ly without animus, bias, or other causes of discrimination, ar-
rangements that eliminate the effect of impairments would be
costly, or in some cases, impossible.4 Only in the most extrava-
gantly imaginary world could we construct a transportation sys-
tem that allowed a blind person to drive a truck or construct a
method of scientific inquiry that allowed a merely average person
to be a physicist. And even if we could, setting up a society that
did so would mean fewer resources would be available for other
purposes. Although it is possible that spending resources this
way is desirable, we need a theory of distributive justice to make
this determination. The language and tools of discrimination pol-
icy are not sufficient for understanding this sort of problem. As
the philosopher David Wasserman noted, an "injunction against
discrimination does not, by itself, tell us the extent to which we
must modify our physical and social environment to accommo-
date people with disabilities."5
The modern focus on discrimination also does not take into
account the vast sums spent every year by the government and
private actors to help the disabled.6 For example, in the United
States in 2003, there were almost two-hundred separate
programs for the disabled, administered by more than twenty
federal agencies. 7 Programs that solely or primarily targeted the
disabled cost more than $120 billion in that year. Payments to
individuals with disabilities from Medicare and Medicaid were
an additional $132 billion in 2002. The Social Security Adminis-
tration ("SSA") spent another $26 billion on the disabled in 2002
through the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program.8
Combined, the total is approximately $275 billion per year in
federal spending directly on the disabled. This excludes state and
local spending (including workers' compensation programs), ad-
4 Susan Wendell, a social model advocate, makes a similar point. See Susan Wen-
dell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability 47-48 (Routledge
1996).
5 David Wasserman, Philosophical Issues in the. Definition and Social Response to
Disability, in Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman, and Michael Bury, eds, Handbook
of Disability Studies 219, 241 (Sage 2003).
6 Bagenstos also makes this observation about the social model. See Bagenstos, 114
Yale L J at 4 (cited in note 1).
' See Government Accountability Office, Federal Disability Assistance: Wide Array of
Programs Needs to be Examined in Light of 21st Century Challenges, GAO-05-626 at 2
(2005), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05626.pdf> (last visited Jan 6, 2009).
8 See id at 14-17.
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ditional federal spending not captured in these numbers (such as
the disability components of larger programs), safety precautions
mandated by law or induced by the tort system, and mandated
private spending because of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
some of which is potentially unrelated to discrimination. 9 The
number also excludes voluntary private spending on disability.
The $275 billion per year number, therefore, is likely a signifi-
cant underestimate of total resources spent on disabilities. By
any measure the numbers are large, and understanding how best
to spend resources of this magnitude is important.
The social model has not resolved these problems in a con-
vincing way. The goal of this Article is to begin the development
of an alternative approach to disabilities based directly on an
explicitly stated theory of distributive justice: welfarist theories.
Welfarist theories have a long and well-developed history of di-
rectly addressing issues of resource allocation where individuals
are assumed to have differing needs. The goal of these theories is
to develop policies that (1) ensure that people's contributions to
society and the resulting distribution of resources are commen-
surate with their abilities, while (2) ensuring that people do not
conceal their true level of ability to get more than their share.
Both elements are, or should be, central to disability policy. Ne-
vertheless, despite the massive literature on disabilities, there
are few if any articles that take this approach, and none in the
legal literature. 10
9 I have been unable to find reliable estimates of ADA compliance costs. In addition,
there are major disputes about the extent to which mandated accommodations are reme-
dies for discrimination and the extent to which they are transfers. See Samuel Issacharoff
and Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination
Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 NC L Rev 307 (2001); Chris-
tine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv L Rev 642 (2001); Pamela S.
Karlan and George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommo-
dation, 46 Duke L J 1 (1996); Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 (cited in note 1); J.H. Verkerke,
Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L Rev 903 (2003). This senseless debate is an example of
the problem created by a focus on discrimination; whether policies are desirable becomes
hostage to definitions rather than focusing on the effects of those policies.
10 Mark Stein argues for a utilitarian approach to disability but he does not explore
any of the policy implications (other than in the loosest sense). See Mark S. Stein, Distri-
butive Justice & Disability: Utilitarianism Against Egalitarianism (Yale 2006). See also
Mark S. Stein, Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources, 16 Bioethics 1
(2002). Peter Singer famously approaches disabilities from a utilitarian perspective. See
Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (Macmil-
lan 1996). Singer's focus, however, is on beginning and end of life issues. The focus here is
on "everyday" policies toward the disabled, such as cash transfers, antidiscrimination
laws, accommodations, and the like. Deciding who does or does not count in social welfare
considerations is, in an important sense, orthogonal to the considerations of the appropri-
ate policy toward those who are part of the social welfare calculation.
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In many cases, welfarist theories will buttress discrimina-
tion theories, sometimes solving puzzles that discrimination
theories present. For example, welfarist theories can help ex-
plain why we might want to require costly accommodations when
it would seem to be cheaper to write people a check, and it can do
so without relying on contested notions of social exclusion, sta-
tus, or neutrality. Similarly, welfarist theories can help develop
an appropriate definition of disability without recourse to notions
such as typical human functioning. At other times, welfarist
theories may part ways with claims of discrimination theorists,
most often because of the welfarist's attention to issues of scarci-
ty, but also because distributive justice may impose duties
beyond even a perfect meritocracy or recompense for past harms.
The analysis will show that there are three key considera-
tions in developing a disabilities policy. First, we must under-
stand how disability affects individuals. If an individual with a
disability is worse off than others or can make better use of lim-
ited resources, a welfarist will, in general, favor allocation of ad-
ditional resources to the individual just like a welfarist favors
redistribution of income. The precise nature of the disability may
affect the desired policy. Disabilities of various sorts will affect
individuals in many ways, and policy prescriptions should be
sensitive to these factors. For example, one plausible effect of
What little welfarist literature focusing on the appropriate treatment of individu-
als with disabilities exists can be found in the public economics literature. There are two
distinct strands within this literature. The first is the literature examining optimal dis-
ability insurance, beginning with the work of Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees. See
Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees, Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with
Variable Retirement, 88 Scandinavian J Econ 25 (1986); Peter Diamond and James Mirr-
lees, A Model of Social Insurance with Variable Retirement, 10 J Pub Econ 295 (1978).
This literature models the risk of disability as the risk of suddenly having a wage rate of
zero and examines the optimal social insurance policy for this risk. An individual with a
disability in these models is the same as any other individual except with respect to the
wage rate.
The second, which is the focus of this Article, builds off of the optimal income tax
literature, adding a second dimension of difference among individuals. This work is still
in its infancy. See, for example, Robin Boadway and Pierre Pestieau, Indirect Taxation
and Redistribution: The Scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem, in Richard Arnott, et al,
eds, Economics for an Imperfect World: Essasy in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz 387 (MIT
2003); Robin Boadway, et al, Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for
Leisure, 4 J Pub Econ Theory 475 (2002); Helmuth Cremer, Pierre Pestieau, and Jean-
Charles Rochet, Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revis-
ited, 42 Intl Econ Rev 781 (2001); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Pre-
ferences, (NBER Working Paper 14170 2008); Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Com-
modity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J Pub
Econ 217 (2002). There is very little cross-fertilization of this literature with the broader
disability literature. The public finance work is never cited in the usual disabilities litera-
ture and the public finance literature does not reference the disabilities literature.
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disability is that it increases needs. A person with a disability
might need an assistive device, additional medical services, or a
particular construction of public architecture, none of which a
person without the disability would need, at least to the same
extent. Someone with increased needs would have lower overall
welfare (for the same income) and increased marginal utility,
both of which mean a welfarist policy would allocate additional
resources to such individuals. Disabilities, however, are likely to
affect individuals in other ways (and may not increase needs),
and the appropriate policies will depend on exactly how a disabil-
ity affects individuals.
A second factor is whether the disability can be observed.
Different types of disability will be differently observable. Spinal
cord injuries might be easy to observe, but back pain and atten-
tion deficit disorder might not be. If disability can be accurately
observed, we can base policies on this information. In particular,
it will be optimal to use the income tax, adjusted to take into ac-
count observable disabilities, for redistribution.
If disabilities cannot be accurately observed, policies that fa-
vor the disabled will create incentives for the nondisabled to pre-
tend to be disabled and claim the benefits. Policies must be de-
signed to reduce these incentives. Simple adjustments to the in-
come tax will no longer be desirable. Instead, we will want to
direct resources toward the disabled through in-kind provision or
taxes and subsidies for commodities that the disabled are more
likely to value than are mimickers. Moreover, it may often be the
case that inefficient, over-provision of these items is desirable to
help target benefits. Thus, an important conclusion is that if ac-
commodations for the disabled are a method of solving targeting
problems, we should not measure whether they are desirable by
whether they are efficient. We should, in fact, want to have inef-
ficient over-provision.
Finally, goods can be provided in a variety of ways, such as
through direct transfers of cash, through in-kind provision of
particular goods, or through changes to public goods (architec-
ture, legal rules, etc.) to help the disabled. It is here that welfar-
ism meets the social model. The social model argues for in-kind
provision of such goods as public architecture, workplace rules,
status, and autonomy. Welfarism has a number of standard tools
for determining the best method of provision. One possibility,
mentioned above, is that in-kind provision can help with target-
ing problems. A second important consideration is whether the
good has public goods aspects. The architectural rules found in
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the ADA can be seen in this light. The social model focuses on
status and autonomy. I am not aware of significant writing with-
in the welfarist tradition on providing status and autonomy as
policy goals. Status might not be readily purchased in the market
so transfers of money may not suffice to provide status. A welfar-
ist may agree, therefore, that direct provision of status, if cheap-
er than providing an equally valued amount of money, would be
desirable (although the issue might be complicated if status is
zero sum). More generally, if the social model points to joint cau-
sation of disability, welfarism allows consideration of the best
method of helping the disabled among the various causes of dis-
advantage because it considers relative costs and benefits.
This Article begins with a long wind up, with the first three
Parts providing background before getting to the analysis. There
is no literature combining disabilities and welfarism, so it is ne-
cessary to provide some background in both areas. The disabili-
ties literature is particularly lacking in discussions of welfarist
distributive policies which are instead found in the technical lit-
erature on optimal taxation. Therefore, a review of this literature
is necessary. Those familiar with these background materials
should skip to Part IV.
Part I provides some stylized facts about disability in the
United States. It is important to have a sense of the size and
scope of the issue, and Part I attempts to provide this back-
ground. The image we have in our heads when thinking about
disability can influence what we think are appropriate outcomes,
and some basic facts can help ensure that the image is accurate.
In addition, a central variable in the analysis is whether a dis-
ability is observable (because inability to observe creates the tar-
geting problem), and getting a sense of the types of disabilities
gives a sense of the extent to which they are observable.
Part II describes the social model and argues that it is
inadequate. Part III provides a brief review of the welfarist
approach to social policy and redistribution generally, not with
respect to disabilities. The relevant literature is the literature on
optimal taxation, a literature which gets almost no mention in
the legal world. There are two results from that literature that
are important for understanding policy toward the disabled.
Modern tax policy is about information. Individuals are assumed
to vary by their ability to earn wages. In a first best world, where
ability can be observed, transfers can be made from the more
able to the less able, so that total or marginal utility (depending
on the choice of social welfare function) is the same across all
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individuals. If ability cannot be observed, however, the govern-
ment faces an incentives problem: If the government raises taxes
on high income individuals, there is an incentive to earn less.
Similarly, if the government makes cash available for all "unable
to work," many able individuals might claim the cash. The op-
timal tax problem is to determine the social welfare maximizing
tax rate schedule subject to this incentives problem. The second
important result, which also at its core is about screening, is the
"income tax only" result. The claim is that we should tax only
labor income (subject to some obscure qualifications related to
leisure). Understanding both results, how incentives affect redis-
tribution and the conditions under which only redistribution of
income is desirable, is central to understanding the treatment of
disabilities.
With these results in mind, Part IV turns to disabilities.
Disability adds a second dimension of difference among individu-
als: they differ with respect to their wage rates and with respect
to disability. The nature of the optimal policy may correspon-
dingly change. Part IV develops the three major considerations
discussed above, focusing on how policy changes depending on
whether disabilities are observable.
Part V provides further comments on the analysis in Part
IV. In particular, Part V discusses how a welfarist approach inte-
racts with the social model, the possibility of private disability
insurance, the changes to policy if the extent of disability is en-
dogenous to policy, and the choice of public or private provision of
accommodations.
I am not considering here several issues that may be impor-
tant. First, I will not discuss animus or bias, the central focus of
the modern disabilities literature. There are many things that
can be and have been said about these issues from a welfarist
perspective,1' but the focus here is on distributive issues because
so little work has been done on these issues (with respect to dis-
abilities). I will, therefore, assume markets work reasonably well
and without significant animus.
Second the focus here is on physical disabilities. Mental
disabilities are also covered by the analysis, but some mental
disabilities may raise additional issues (concerning preference
formation and maximization) that are beyond the scope of this
Article.
11 For a summary of the economics literature on discrimination, see Kevin Lang,
Poverty and Discrimination (Princeton 2007).
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Third, I am not dealing with beginning of life or end of life
issues, which is the focus of Peter Singer's application of utilitar-
ianism to disabilities. 12 Without agreeing or disagreeing with his
views, his approach does not seem to me to be distinctly utilita-
rian. All ethical theories will have similar issues of who counts.
Finally, some disabilities policies disregard or attempt to
change preferences. Antidiscrimination laws, which outlaw act-
ing on certain preferences, may be seen in this way, as attempts
to change attitudes or norms. Many welfarists would not include
animus or similar preferences in the social welfare function. 13
Thus, welfarism can be made consistent with this approach.
Some policies, however, are sometimes justified as an attempt to
change preferences more generally. 14 Welfarism can incorporate
learning which can result in changes in views, but attempting to
change fully informed preferences is more problematic. Although
there is much to say about this issue, I will not consider it here.
Before beginning the discussion, it is worth a few words
about the use of language in this Article. It is standard in the
taxation and public economics literature to refer to transfer
payments and to redistribution. Whether something is a transfer
or whether it redistributes, however, must be measured against
a background of initial entitlements. The usual norm in the tax
literature is to assume a purely laissez faire economy (with no
taxes but somehow with everything else the same), and measure
any payments against the amounts individuals would have had
in such a world. Labels based on this approach, however, are po-
tentially erroneous because it assumes there is some merit to the
laissez faire world. The laissez faire world, however, plays no
role in welfarist policy. A welfarist approach requires a behind
the veil determination of the optimal set of rules with no prefe-
rence given to one set of outcomes over another. Therefore,
"transfer payments" to the disabled as measured against a lai-
ssez faire background might otherwise be viewed as rights or as
part of a just or fair outcome.
Language in disability policy matters. One of the objections
to many policies, including those that provided significant re-
sources to the disabled, was that they viewed the disabled as
12 See Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (cited in note 10).
13 See, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Har-
vard 2002); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc Res
623 (1977).
14 For example, the ADA is sometimes defended as illustrating to the nondisabled
that the disabled can be more productive than previously thought.
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somehow not fully human. For example, David Wasserman notes
that disabilities scholars "argue that in seeking to compensate
people for their 'natural' disadvantages, distributive justice in-
evitably denigrates those seen as disadvantaged."15 Similar ex-
penditures to provide "equal access" might not. The disability
community responded by adopting the language of civil rights
and antidiscrimination. 16 It is important to keep in mind that
notwithstanding the language of transfers and redistribution,
welfarist policy toward the disabled might well be compatible
with many policies advocated by disabilities advocates with a
mere changing in how the policies are framed. Moreover, if the
language or method used to deliver resources is significant, a
welfarist would want to take this into account. I will continue to
use the standard language of public economics with the caveat
that ultimately policy determinations need to take into account
the social meaning and framing of policies.
I. STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
One of the important elements in determining appropriate
policy toward the disabled is an understanding. of how disability
affects individuals. This should be true for any approach to dis-
ability, but a welfarist particularly needs to know this, as policy
is based only on these facts. Understanding the exact extent and
nature of disability in the United States is difficult, and under-
standing its effects around the world is an exercise in guesswork.
This Part offers some stylized facts about disability in the United
States to help develop intuitions about the effects of disability.
One of the problems is that data can be based only on the
current state of affairs, which may be suboptimal. The welfare of
the disabled is likely to change with policies, so data about the
current status of the disabled may not tell us likely status under
various policies. For example, the social model of disability
argues that society has unfairly arranged itself to exclude the
disabled, say by requiring the use of stairs to access many build-
15 David Wasserman, Disability, Capability, and Thresholds for Distributive Justice,
in Alexander Kaufman, ed, Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems 214, 218
(Routledge 2006) (describing disability rights leaders as viewing the distributive justice
approach "with suspicion, seeing it as perpetuating the belief that disability was either a
natural misfortune outside the scope of justice, or a deficiency so profound as to demand
special priority in a fair cooperative scheme").
16 See, for example, Richard K. Scotch, From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming
Federal Disability Policy 5-40 (Temple 2001) (explaining that disabled communities now
see disablement as a civil rights issue with concerns about discrimination).
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ings. Data showing those in wheelchairs are more likely to be
unemployed and poorer than others may reflect this social ar-
rangement rather than anything inherent about disability.
Data on the disabled also depend on the definition of disabil-
ity. Definitions vary because data are collected for a variety of
different purposes; as a result, the main surveys of disability da-
ta estimate a broad range of disability prevalence in the United
States. 17 Surveys collecting disability data differ according to
population surveyed,18 methodology, 19 survey date,20 response
rate,21 and other factors. Even holding these factors constant,
data on disability prevalence depend on whether disability is de-
17 The major surveys collecting disability data are: Census, American Community
Survey ("ACS"); Survey of Income and Program Participation ("SIPP"'; Panel Study of
Income Dynamics ("PSID"); Current Population Study-March Supplement ("CPS");
National Health Interview Survey ("NHIS"); and the National Health Interview Survey-
Disability Supplement ("NHIS-D"). For summaries of each survey's data, see Rehabilita-
tion Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics, Disability
Statistics User Guide Series, Cornell University, available at <http://www.digitalcommons
.ilr.cornell.edu> (last visited Jan 13, 2009).
18 For examples of the Census and ACS collection of disability data for the general
population, see William J. Erickson and Andrew J. Houtenville, A Guide to Disability
Statistics from the 2000 Decennial Census 7 (Census 2005) ("designed to collect data from
100 percent of all households"); Robert R. Weathers, A Guide to Disability Statistics from
the American Community Survey 7 (ACS 2005) (describing the surveyed population as "a
sample drawn from the universe of U.S. households"). For examples of other surveys,
such as PSID and CPS, which collect disability data for the working-age population only,
see Richard V. Burkhauser, Robert R. Weathers II, and Mathis Schroeder, A Guide to
Disability Statistics from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1 (PSID 2006) (describing
questions as focused upon employment); Robert V. Burkhauser and Andrew J. Houten-
ville, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the Current Population Study: Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (March CMS) 11 (CPS 2006) (describing a "work limitation
question" designed to "capture the working-age population with disabilities").
19 For an example of the longitudinal data offered by PSID and CPS see Burkhauser,
Weathers, and Schroeder, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics at 2 (cited in note 18); Burkhauser and Houtenville, A Guide to Disability Sta-
tistics from the Current Population Study at 9 (cited in note 18). For other surveys, such
as NHIS and ACS, which periodically survey a sample of the population, see Benjamin H.
Harris, Gerry Hendershot, and David C. Stapleton, A Guide to Disability Statistics from
the National Health Interview Survey 12 (NHIS 2005) ("The NHIS sample is based upon a
complex design incorporating ... multistate sampling."); Weathers, A Guide to Disability
Statistics from the American Community Survey at 8 (cited in note 18).
20 Compare the most recent readily available data from the 2005 CPS, see Burkhaus-
er and Houtenville, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the Current Population Study,
(cited in note 18) with the most recent version of NHIS-D data from 1994-95, see Elaine
Maag, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the National Health Interview Survey-
Disability Supplement (2006).
21 Compare Erickson and Houtenville, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the 2000
Decennial Census at 11 (cited in note 18) (reporting a 67 percent response rate for Census
(2002)), with Weathers, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the American Community
Survey at 9 (cited in note 18) (reporting a 95 to 97 percent response rate for ACS (2003),
which used a three-step process to follow up on targeted households).
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fined as a condition which prevents a person from working; 22 re-
sults in difficulty completing everyday activities (known as Activ-
ities of Daily Living, or ADLs);23 causes sensory limitations, such
as impaired vision; or some other definition. For example, the
Census Bureau defines disability as self-reported limitations in
performing various activities. SSA collects data on those who
receive disability insurance, which requires complete inability to
work for a long period of time. As one might expect, their num-
bers differ. There are no facts free of definitions, and the defini-
tions vary. With these caveats in mind, the following are some
rough ideas about the extent of disability and its nature.
A. Prevalence
Surveys report a broad range of disability prevalence. At the
high end, the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program
Participation ("SIPP") reports data on disability prevalence col-
lected through interviews that question respondents about abili-
ty to complete ADLs, ability to work, and sensory limitations. 24
The Census Bureau finds that in 2002, 51.2 million people (18.1
percent) of the (non-institutionalized) 25 population reported hav-
ing a disability. 26 Of this total, 32.5 million reported having a
severe disability. At the low end, and within the working age
population (eighteen to sixty-four) the 2004 Current Population
22 For an example of CPS and SIPP questioning survey respondents about work limi-
tations, see Burkhauser and Houtenville, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the Cur-
rent Population Study at 11 (cited in note 18); David Wittenburg and Sandi Nelson, A
Guide to Disability Statistics from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 10-11
(SIPP 2006).
23 For example, Census, SIPP, and ACS ask respondents whether they experience
difficulty in completing Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), such as bathing or dressing. See
Erickson and Houtenville, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the 2000 Decennial Cen-
sus at 36 Table 1A (cited in note 18) (asking if the respondent has "difficulty ...
[diressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home"); Wittenburg and Nelson, A Guide
to Disability Statistics from the Survey of Income and Program Participation at 38 Table 2
(cited in note 22) (describing questions about ADLs); Weathers, A Guide to Disability
Statistics from the American Community Survey at 35 Table L.a (cited in note 18).
24 Erika Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities: 2002 2 Figure 1
(Census 2006).
25 SIPP and Census reports on the disabled population do not include data on the
institutionalized population. The institutionalized population includes the prison popula-
tion, but also includes nursing home residents. See Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Ameri-
cans with Disabilities at 1 (cited in note 24) ('The population represented [ ] is the civilian
noninstitutionalized population ... nursing homes, are not reported."); Judith Waldrop
and Sharon M. Stern, US Census Bureau, Disability Status: 2000, 1 (Census 2003) (stat-
ing that the report "excludes people in the military and people who are in institutions").
26 Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities at 3 Table A (cited in
note 24).
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Study ("CPS") estimates that around 14 million individuals are
disabled; SIPP estimates over 31 million disabled for a similar
population.27
The Social Security Administration assesses disability of
working-age individuals for the purpose of awarding disability
insurance benefits. By the SSA's measure, individuals are eligi-
ble for benefits if they cannot engage in any substantial gainful
activity because of a long-term disability. There are 8 million
beneficiaries of disability insurance, 2 6.2 million of them dis-
abled workers. 29
It is not easy to find a breakdown of the types of disabilities.
Few studies highlight this issue. For example, Census Bureau
data list type of disability only when studying the effect of dis-
ability on employment, not as something interesting on its own.
Distilling their data, the top ten disabilities are:30
27 See Harris, Hendershot, and Stapleton, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the
National Health Interview Survey at 69 Table 18 (cited in note 19).
28 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Sec-
urity Bulletin, 2005 (SSA 2005). The cost of providing disability insurance to these benefi-
ciaries was $78.2 billion in 2004, making up just under 16 percent of the total Social
Security payments. Id at 2. This number also represents an increase of 10.3 percent from
the 2003 numbers, making disability insurance the fastest growing part of Social Securi-
ty. Id.
29 Id. The non-workers are disabled adult children, widows, widowers, spouses, or
minor and student children of disabled workers. Therefore, some but not all of the non-
workers are disabled under the SSA definitions.
30 Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities at 25 Table 5 (cited in
note 24). See also Stephen H. Kaye, Improved Employment Opportunities for People with
Disabilities, Disability Statistics Center, Institute for Health and Aging Figure 19 (2003)
(using NHIS data from 1988 to 1996 to compile a list of the most prevalent conditions
causing inability to work among working-age adults). Back problems and heart disease
dominate the Disability Statistics Center list. Diabetes is much less prevalent, perhaps
reflecting the increase in diabetes over the last decade. And, the overall numbers on the
Disability Statistics Center list are lower. See also Robert Haveman and Barbara Wolfe,
The Economics of Disability and Disability Policy, in A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, eds,
Handbook of Health Economics, 996, 1007 Table 4 (North-Holland 2000) (providing a list
of the causes of disability around the world and for developed countries). The list is simi-
lar but not identical because it gives causes of impairment rather than impairments
themselves. For example, the list includes road traffic accidents, a cause of impairment
but not an impairment itself. The Census data reproduced in the text focuses instead on
impairments.
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Chronic health problems rather than what many might have
thought of as disabilities (such as blindness, deafness, and spinal
cord injuries) make up the vast majority of the total and the six
largest categories. Of the top ten items, about 80 percent of indi-
viduals have chronic health problems (comprised of the first six
items on the list-it is not clear how to count stiffness and de-
formity of the arms and legs). Backaches are by far the largest
single item. The items also vary dramatically in how preventable
they are: diabetes, high blood pressure, and cardiovascular dis-
ease may all be preventable, while mental problems, some forms
of deafness, and vision problems may be much more difficult to
prevent.
B. Income and Work
Disability is strongly associated with low income. According
to the SIPP data, the poverty rate for people aged twenty-five to
sixty-four with no disability was 7.7 percent. The rate for indi-
viduals with a nonsevere disability was 11.2 percent and 25.9
percent for individuals with a severe disability.31 Also, individu-
als with a chronic disability experience, on average, a 20 percent
drop in hourly earnings. 32 For the disabled, a byproduct of pover-
ty is a decrease in food and housing consumption; those with a
31 Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities at 3 Table A (cited in
note 24).
32 Bruce D. Meyer and Wallace K.C. Mok, Disability, Earnings, and Consumption, 20
(Harris Sch of Pub Policy, Working Paper No 06.10, 2006) ("The long term decline in
hourly earnings is about 20% for [chronic-not severe and chronic-severe groups]."). The
authors draw on panel data from PSID in assembling their findings.
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severe disability report a 22 percent drop in housing and food
consumption ten years after onset of disability.33
Disability leads to a decrease in hours worked annually; an
effect that is most severe for the chronically disabled. 34 Almost
53 percent of the nondisabled were employed full-time, year-
round. Approximately 44 percent of individuals with a nonsevere
disability and 13 percent of individuals with a severe disability
were employed full-time, year-round. Almost 58 percent of indi-
viduals with a severe disability were unemployed, year-round.
SIPP breaks down these numbers by type of disability, and their
data show significant variance by type.35
C. Needs/Expenditures
Another important aspect of disability that might affect util-
ity is basic needs. There is considerable evidence that individuals
with disabilities have higher basic needs than others. The Cen-
sus Bureau reports that 10.7 million individuals with disabilities
ages six and over needed personal assistance with one or more
activities of daily living or instrumental activities of daily liv-
ing.36 (They do not report the comparable figures for the nondi-
sabled but it is likely to be close to zero because disability is de-
33 Id at 88 Table 12.
34 Id at 75 Table 4b.
35 Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities at 25 Table 5 (cited in
note 24). SIPP reports the highest rates of employment, for the population twenty-one to
sixty-four, for those whose underlying health problem is deafness or difficulty hearing
(95.6 percent), thyroid problems (73.6 percent), and hernia (71.6 percent). Id. SIPP re-
ports the lowest rates of employment for those whose underlying health problem is para-
lysis (23.4 percent), mental retardation (34.7 percent), and cerebral palsy (36.25 percent).
Id.
According to 2003 data from ACS, for people with disabilities aged twenty-five to
sixty-one, those with a sensory disability have the highest rate of employment (49.9 per-
cent), and those with an outside the home disability have the lowest rate of employment
(17.9 percent). See Weathers, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the American Commu-
nity Survey at 41 Table 4 (cited in note 18).
I have been unable to find good data on the number of individuals affected by the
ADA. The EEOC collects some data on the number of complaints, but this does not tell us
the number of affected individuals. Studies of the effect of the ADA on employment, for
example, typically use Census data. See, for example, Christine Jolls and J.J. Prescott,
Disaggregating Employment Discrimination: The Case of Disability Discrimination, Har-
vard Law and Economics Discussion Paper N. 496 (2005) available at <http://ssrn.coml
abstract=580741> (last visited Feb 20, 2009).
36 Steinmetz, US Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities (cited in note 24). Also,
according to 2002 data from NHIS, 34.7 percent of individuals over sixty-four and 16.7
percent of individuals eighteen to sixty-four reported currently using a special assistive
device, including hearing aids. Harris, Hendershot, and Stapleton, A Guide to Disability
Statistics from the National Health Interview Survey at 67-68 Tables 16-17 (cited in note
19).
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fined in their report as having an impairment that limits such
activities.)
Two econometric studies have attempted to quantify the ad-
ditional needs of the disabled, controlling for income and other
factors.37 Both studies find that there are substantial consump-
tion costs associated with disability. For example, one of the stu-
dies compared the standard of living for the individuals with and
without disability at a given level of income. The authors con-
clude "disability generates significant additional costs." 38
Disability is also likely to be associated with higher health
care expenditures, particularly for individuals with chronic ill-
ness.3 9 Diabetes and cardiovascular problems (together compris-
ing four of the top ten disabilities) are a major source of health
care spending. The National Medical Expenditures Survey
("NMES"), conducted in 1987 and 1988, shows that the disabled
(defined as individuals with an activity limitation) were 17 per-
cent of the population but accounted for 47 percent of national
medical expenditures. 40
D. Happiness
A different way to try to understand the effect of disability is
through self-reported levels of happiness. The field of hedonic
psychology takes this approach. The relationship of happiness to
well-being is not clear, but at a minimum, it is an important
component. A common take on this literature is that disability
37 Andrew Jones and Owen O'Donnell, Equivalence Scales and the Costs of Disability,
56 J Pub Econ 273 (1995); Ashgar Zaidi and Tania Burchardt, Comparing Incomes When
Needs Differ: Equivalization for the Extra Costs of Disability in the UK, 51 Rev Income &
Wealth 89 (2005).
38 Zaidi and Burchardt, 51 Rev Income & Wealth 89 (cited in note 37).
39 Expenditures include assistive technology and frequent doctor visits. According to
2002 data from NHIS, 34.7 percent of individuals over sixty-four and 16.7 percent of
individuals eighteen to sixty-four report using a special assistive device, including hear-
ing aids. Harris, Hendershot, and Stapleton, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the
National Health Interview Survey at 67-68 Tables 16-17 (cited in note 19).
40 US Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research, National Medical Expenditures Survey 1987 Table E (1995). Also, according to
2002 data from NHIS, individuals with disabilities reported consulting with a health care
professional within the last year at a higher rate than nondisabled individuals. Among
disabled respondents, 77.9 percent in the eighteen to sixty-four age group, and 88.5 per-
cent in the sixty-five and older age group, reported consulting a general practitioner in
the last year. Harris, Hendershot, and Stapleton, A Guide to Disability Statistics from the
National Health Interview Survey at 57-62 Tables 16-17 (cited in note 19). By contrast,
among nondisabled respondents, 61.5 percent in the eighteen to sixty-four age group, and
79.3 percent in the sixty-five and older age group, reported consulting a general practi-
tioner. Id.
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does not reduce happiness, at least after an initial period of
adaptation. 41 A closer examination of the studies shows evidence
of some, but not full, adaptation.
The most famous study of the effects of disability on happi-
ness is the Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman study compar-
ing people with spinal cord injuries with lottery winners. 42 They
asked eleven paraplegics and eighteen quadriplegics to rate their
own happiness on a scale of one to five and compared them to a
control group (as well as a group of lottery winners). The controls
reported an average happiness of 3.82 while those with spinal
cord injuries reported happiness of 2.96, a lower number (they
did not perform a significance test). For some reason, the authors
view this as evidence of adaptation by the disabled, but such a
claim may merely reflect the prior assumptions of the authors
that those with spinal cord injuries should have been more un-
happy. It is not clear that this interpretation is valid, particular-
ly given the difficulty with interpreting scales in these sorts of
studies. It is only clear that the happiness number is lower.
Moreover, when asked about past happiness, those with spinal
cord injuries reported a mean of 4.41, indicating that they
thought of themselves as significantly less happy now than be-
fore their injury. (The controls reported the opposite: higher cur-
rent happiness than past happiness.)43
There have been a wide variety of studies that attempted to
replicate the Brickman paper.44 The studies vary in methodology
and precise questions addressed and come to mixed conclusions.
The most recent and thorough of these is a longitudinal study by
41 For a general overview, see Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (Knopf 2006).
42 Philip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J of Personality and Social Psych 917 (1978)
(comparing self-reported levels of happiness among lottery winners, recently paralyzed
accident victims, and a control group).
43 Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longi-
tudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 2 (Inst for the
Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No 2208, 2006) (stating that the Brickman paper
"report[s] data in which disabled people do have lower life-satisfaction scores than the
able-bodied, and this difference, when compared to a control group, is statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels").
44 For a summary, see Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adapta-
tion, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norrbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The Foun-
dations of Hedonic Psychology 302 (Russell Sage Foundation 1999). For more recent pa-
pers, see Jason Riis, et al, Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study
Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J Experimental Psych: Gen 3 (2005); I. Ville
and J.F. Ravaud, Subjective Well-Being and Severe Motor Impairments: The Tetrafigap
Survey on the Long-Term Outcome of Tetrafigap Spinal Cord Injured Persons, 52 Soc Sci
& Med 369 (2001).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee in 2006.45 They ex-
ploit the British Household Panel Survey, which is a representa-
tive sample of more than ten thousand adults conducted each
year. Data from 1996 to 2002 include information on psychologi-
cal well-being. They examine the effects of severe disabilities
(disabilities that make it impossible to work) on well-being over
time. Their conclusions are mixed. They find clear evidence of
adaptation to disability but also that individuals do not always
return to their pre-disability happiness level. According to Table
5, the level of adaptation appears to be correlated with the de-
gree of disability.46
Welfarists care about marginal utility as well as utility, and
it is even more difficult to get a handle on this factor. Lower in-
come and higher needs point to higher marginal utility. Beyond
this, it is not clear what more we can say. The hedonic studies
tell us nothing about marginal utility. (Most do not control for
income.) Many disabled are likely to have a higher marginal util-
ity from consuming certain items, such as medical care. Someone
with a back problem or arthritis might gain more utility from a
pain killer than someone without these problems. On the other
hand, disabilities might reduce the marginal utility from other
items; the blind are unlikely to benefit from visual arts. Other
than that needs are higher and income lower, it is not clear that
we can draw any conclusions about marginal utility. Neverthe-
less, knowing that needs are higher and income lower may be
sufficient to support a general presupposition that disability in-
creases marginal utility, although this will vary by disability.
II. THE SOCIAL MODEL
The dominant approach to disability is known as the social
model. This Part will discuss the social model and argue that it
has significant limitations as the sole model for addressing disa-
bility. As noted, this Article is not intended to be primarily a crit-
icism of the social model, so the discussion is brief. Nevertheless,
an understanding of some of its limitations is important for un-
45 Oswald and Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? at 14 Table 5 (cited in note 43).
46 See also Dylan M. Smith, et al, Health, Wealth, and Happiness: Financial Re-
sources Buffer Subjective Well-Being After the Onset of a Disability, 16 Psych Sci 663
(2005) (reporting that the extent that disability reduces subjective well-being is correlated
with income: higher income individuals report smaller reductions in well-being because of
health problems than do lower income individuals).
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derstanding the merits of an approach based on distributive jus-
tice and tax policy.
Discussions of the social model invariably begin by describ-
ing a foil, known as the medical model.47 It is not easy to define
the medical model precisely because it is not a coherent view laid
out by a particular set of commentators. 48 Instead, it is a distilla-
tion of the normally unarticulated views that seem to underlie
many of the social policies toward the disabled. To the extent it
can be defined, the medical model approaches disabilities as
physical or psychological limitations of an individual that affect
functioning and that should, if possible, be prevented or re-
paired.49 Social policy under the medical model is focused on the
disabled individual and on curing or preventing the impairment.
Disabilities in this model are primarily a medical condition.
Although not intrinsic in this view, the medical model is as-
sociated with a set of social practices that were viewed as deeply
undesirable by the disabled. In particular, the medical model is
associated with institutionalization of the disabled along with a
lack of say about treatments. As tenBroek and Matson famously
argued, the disabled were required to obey sometimes oppressive
institutional rules as a condition of getting aid; in their words,
the disabled were faced with a choice of "obedience or starva-
tion."50 The medical model is also associated with demeaning at-
titudes toward the disabled, treating the disabled as objects of
pity or disgust rather than as individuals. 51
While these practices were undesirable, social model advo-
cates argued that the medical approach suffered from a more
fundamental problem: it located the source of functional limita-
tions in the impaired individual. For example, the medical ap-
proach viewed the inability to use one's legs as the reason a
47 See, for example, Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 76-78 (cited in note 1); Crossley, 35
Rutgers L J at 876 (cited in note 1). For a detailed history, see David L. Braddock and
Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in Gary L. Albrecht, et al, eds,
Handbook of Disability Studies 11 (Sage 2001).
48 For example, despite reading numerous descriptions of the medical view as a foil
for the social model, I have been unable to find a citation for anyone actually taking this
view.
49 For a good summary of this view, see John Harris, Is Gene Therapy a Form of
Eugenics?, 7 Bioethics 178 (1993); John Harris, Is There a Coherent Social Conception of
Disability?, 6 J Med Ethics 95 (2000).
50 Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
Cal L Rev 809, 831 (1966).
51 For numerous illustrations of demeaning behavior toward the disabled, see gener-
ally Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement (Random House 1993).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
paraplegic cannot enter a building with stairs. Social model ad-
vocates argued that if the building had ramps instead of stairs,
the paraplegic would have equivalent mobility to those who can
walk. The impairment would not cause a functional limitation
under a different set of social arrangements. The medical ap-
proach misses the key causal link in the creation of a disability.
Following this logic, the social model separates the notions of
impairment and disability. Impairment is a medical condition
such as arthritis, blindness, or spinal cord injury. More general-
ly, one might think of individuals as having traits that follow
natural human variation. Disability is the functional limitation.
The key claim of the social model is that disability depends on
the interaction of social arrangements and impairments. It takes
both the stairs and the spinal cord injury to create the limitation.
Disabilities, therefore, have social causes. As described by Sam
Bagenstos "disability is not an essentially medical condition that
inheres in the disabled person; it is a social condition caused by
the interaction between a person's physical or mental traits and
social institutions that are structured in a way that makes them
inaccessible to people with those traits."52
At this level of generality, the model is surely correct but it
is also mundane. If it said no more, it would be a modest modifi-
cation to the traditional approach. Pointing out that there are
multiple causes of functional limitations merely shows that there
might be multiple solutions. Nothing in the medical model would
argue against using the cheaper method to solve the problem.
Eyeglasses are likely cheaper than making all signs in large
print, changing traffic rules, and making other accommodations
to the environment to accommodate the near and far-sighted, so
the best response to vision problems is medical, not social.
Ramps may be cheaper than other methods of helping those with
spinal cord injuries, so changes to the social environment may be
the best social policy. The medical model can incorporate these
ideas. Advocates for the social model, however, took the argu-
ments two large steps beyond this point.
The first of the two steps is a claim that the sole source of
functional limitations is the set of social arrangements. Although
counterintuitive, the argument can be illustrated through analo-
gy to racism. It takes both race and prejudice to create racism,
but we do not say that because a person is black, he is a partially
responsible for the consequences of racism. Prejudice is viewed
52 Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 12 (cited in note 1).
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as the sole cause. Advocates argue that disability is similar. In-
dividuals vary in many ways. Social practices that cause func-
tional limitations or exclusion given that variation are the cause
of disability. Arguing that physical impairments cause functional
limitations is like arguing that race causes Jim Crow. As one of
the social model founders, Michael Oliver, put it, "disability is
wholly and exclusively social."53
The second step followed naturally. If social policies prevent
equal access to desired goods-jobs, wealth, status, access to
buildings, treatment as a human being, or whatever-to a set of
individuals based on physical impairment, it is the obligation of
society to eliminate those policies just like it is the obligation of
society to eliminate policies that deny people opportunities based
on race or sex. The problem is one of discrimination, and civil
rights are the appropriate response.
The social view is sufficiently dominant that it can now be
described as "the" approach to disabilities. Like any large school
of thought, there are subtle variations on what various commen-
tators think is discrimination and what remedies are owed. Not
every social model advocate adopts the strongest version of the
arguments, such as defining social arrangements as the sole
cause of every disability. 54 In fact, most social model advocates
likely accept some limitation to this claim. Nevertheless, even for
individuals who back away from the strongest claims of the mod-
el, disability is approached as a problem of discrimination to be
solved using the tools of antidiscrimination theory and law. The
Americans with Disabilities Act is the crowning achievment of
the social model, putting the antidiscrimination approach at the
forefront of disability policy.
Notwithstanding its broad acceptance, there are a number of
serious problems with the core ideas in the social model. Adam
Samaha has recently pointed out that, as a pure model of causa-
tion, the social model does not entail any particular policy re-
sults.5 5 One has to have a theory of desirable social policies to
determine what one does with the brute fact of causation. A li-
bertarian, for example, might fully agree that disability is caused
53 Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (cited in note 1).
54 For example, Wendell rejects the view that social arrangements are the sole cause
of disability. See Wendell, The Rejected Body (cited in note 4).
55 Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U Chi L Rev
1251 (2007). See also Wasserman, Philosophical Issues at 299 (cited in note 5) ("As long
as those disadvantages were not voluntarily chosen or risked, their source of locus will
have no direct relevance on most plausible accounts of distributive justice.").
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by the interaction of individual variation and the social environ-
ment but conclude that no consequences should follow unless
disadvantage was created through force or fraud. A utilitarian is
not likely to care as a first order matter about causation, instead
focusing on consequences of policies. To account for this gap,
most social model advocates have an underlying, if unstated,
egalitarian norm that social arrangements should give all indi-
viduals equal opportunities, resources, or some other good. With-
out detailed specification, however, it is not clear exactly what
the policy implications are from the various subtle variations in
egalitarian norms.56 As Samaha argues, the social model without
more has no policy implications.
Second, it is simply not the case that social arrangements
are the sole cause of disability. Other than in an extravagantly
imaginary future world, social arrangements are not even a
cause of some disabilities. A blind person cannot drive a truck.
Someone with an abnormally low IQ cannot be a physicist.
Someone in a persistent vegetative state would not make an
effective teacher. These limitations are not caused by social
arrangements under any reasonable notion of potential social
arrangements. They are also not caused by animus, bias, ignor-
ance, or any other source of discrimination. Unlike with Jim
Crow, there are sensible reasons for the social practices that
cause these impairments to have these functional limitations. By
arguing that all disabilities are socially caused, the social model
conflates ordinary and rational policies with those caused by
animus or discrimination more generally.
Third, and related, the discrimination model, by treating all
disadvantages as caused by animus or ignorance, ignores impor-
tant distributive questions. Accommodations can be costly, par-
ticularly the extravagant kinds envisioned by the purer versions
of the social model. We need to understand what resources
should be used to provide these accommodations. The issue is
56 One argument for an antidiscrimination approach to disabilities is that discrimina-
tion arises from bad information, say, about the ability of someone with an impairment to
perform a job or about the cost and benefits of an accommodation. This might arise from
ill-considered fear or rational ignorance. Antidiscrimination laws in such a case act as
information devices. The relevant question is why the information is not known, particu-
larly for policies aimed at profit-maximizing businesses, which have strong incentives to
employ value-maximizing workers. To the extent that we can cast discrimination as a
problem of information notwithstanding market incentives, it fits within a welfarist
framework. For a related argument, that informational inefficiencies in the job market
make a legal accommodation requirement efficient, see Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?
(cited in note 9).
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essentially distributive. To provide accommodations, we have to
take from some to give to others. Sometimes we will be justified
in doing so, but sometimes we will not be, and we must distin-
guish these cases. The tools of discrimination, however, are not
up to this task. The social model ignores the brute fact of scarcity
and, therefore, is unable to address distributional questions.
Even in a world without wrongful discrimination, disability
policy would be necessary. As Richard Arneson argued, "what we
owe to one another by way of social justice requirements goes
beyond meritocratic nondiscrimination." 57 Wealth transfers, such
as SSI, SSDI, Medicaid, and Medicare, are enormous and enor-
mously important, possibly life-saving, to most recipients, and
would continue to be so even in a world entirely cured of discrim-
ination defined in the broadest possible sense. Any analysis of
disability that does not account for these types of programs is
insufficient. The discrimination view has strong political valence
because of the history of the civil rights movement. There are
undoubtedly deep pools of animus against individuals with cer-
tain (but not all) disabilities. The basis of the discrimination view
is appealingly meritocratic; it simply seeks to open up opportuni-
ties to those with talent. Modest changes in social arrangements
may bring large benefits. Nevertheless, as an approach to study-
ing the broader issue of disability, it is too narrow, and, in its
broadest forms, implausible.
As a final note, a pure social model does not work well on
pragmatic grounds, as a way of articulating problems and finding
common ground for solutions. There are two core problems. The
first is in the definition of discrimination. In many cases, disabil-
ity can affect one's ability to perform a job. Yet an antidiscrimi-
nation view seeks to eliminate the effect of disability from that
consideration. If all effects of disability are eliminated, however,
the meritocratic ideal which underlies antidiscrimination policies
is also eliminated. We cannot ask a blind person to drive a truck,
even if he is otherwise fully qualified. Unlike with race, and to a
far greater extent than with gender, the underlying goal of meri-
tocracy and the antidiscrimination cure of eliminating factors
from decision making are often at odds. To be sure, they are not
always at odds-there has been and no doubt continues to be
significant pure animus against the disabled. Moreover, one can
57 Richard Arneson, Disability, Discrimination and Priority, in Leslie P. Francis and
Anita Silvers, eds, Americans with Disabilities: Exploring the Implications of the Law for
Individuals and Institutions 18 (Routledge 2000).
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balance competing considerations, trying to find factors that af-
fect job performance that are not affected by disability, as the
ADA attempts to do. There is, however, a deep level of tension in
applying antidiscrimination norms to disabilities, a tension that
moves to the surface once one moves away from the easy cases.
Second, questions of desirable social policies become hostage
to debates about whether a particular arrangement is discrimi-
nation and whether a particular remedy can be classified as a
solution to discrimination. The most important example is the
mandate for reasonable accommodations found in the ADA.
There is a substantial debate about whether the accommodation
requirement is properly viewed as a transfer or as antidiscrimi-
nation. 8 Under a discrimination view, the outcome of this debate
determines the appropriate social policy because society only
owes it to individuals to give them an equal chance. The debate
then becomes a debate about what it means to have an equal
chance when individuals have different starting points. At this
point, at least to me, the debate becomes unenlightening because
it is essentially an argument about resource allocation being
forced into antidiscrimination language. The tools of discrimina-
tion policy are inadequate to answering these sorts of questions.
It is time to move beyond the social model. This fact is start-
ing to be recognized. Sam Bagenstos has argued that disabilities
advocates on the ground have moved their focus to enforcing ex-
isting social welfare laws and that advocates should consider "di-
rect and sustained government interventions such as the public
funding and provision of benefits." 59 Martha Nussbaum has ad-
vocated for an approach to disabilities based on the capabilities
theory of social welfare. 60 Below, I illustrate how a welfarist
theory using the tools of tax policy would address the issue.
58 See, for example, Issacharoff and Nelson, 79 NC L Rev 307 (cited in note 9); Jolls,
115 Harv L Rev 642 (cited in note 9); Karlan and Rutherglen, 46 Duke L J 1 (cited in note
9); Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 (cited in note 1); Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient? (cited in
note 9).
59 Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 4 (cited in note 1).
60 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Mem-
bership (Harvard 2006). A full exploration of the capabilities theory as applied to disabili-
ties is beyond the scope of this Article. The capabilities theory can be thought of as an
objective approach to welfarism. See Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford
1985); Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Wiley-Blackwell 1987); Amartya Sen,
Equality of What?, Tanner Lectures on Human Values (May 22, 1979) available at
<http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edullectures/documents/sen80.pdf> (last visited Jan 15,
2009). The goal of social policy, it is argued, should be to provide individuals with the
basic capabilities to achieve the level of functioning that is central to human flourishing.
The theory remains in its early stages and there are a number of problems that need to be
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III. WELFARE AND OPTIMAL TAXATION
In the next three Parts, I will illustrate a welfarist approach
to disabilities. This Part provides general background discussion
on welfarism. The next Part presents a welfarist analysis of dis-
ability. The final Part discusses extensions and implementation
issues.
Much of the discussion in this Part is of the tax literature,
and it is worth pausing to motivate this discussion. There are
two key connections to disability policy. First, tax policy is fo-
cused on distribution. If we were not worried about the distribu-
tion of income, we could simply have a head tax. Because this
would be unfair-paupers would pay the same as billionaires-
we use a tax that has better distributive properties. We want
those with higher ability to pay more. The distribution of re-
sources is the central issue in tax policy. Disability, as I have
argued above, is also very much a problem of distribution and,
therefore, is deeply connected to taxation. Second, the reason
distribution is difficult is that we cannot tell who has high ability
and who does not. There is a targeting problem. We are left rely-
ing on proxies like income. Thus, the central problem in taxation
is to determine the best distributive policy subject to the target-
ing problem. Similarly, if disabilities are not observable and we
redistribute toward the disabled, we will very soon discover we
have a targeting problem as individuals masquerade as disabled
to get the benefits. Thus, the problems are parallel, and in fact I
will argue that they are intricately linked. Thus, to understand
disability policy we must understand the key features of tax poli-
cy.
A. Background on Welfarism
There is a huge literature on welfarism, exploring its merits
and problems, as well as the many subtleties, such as whether
the object of welfarism is preference satisfaction or some other
measure of the good. I will not review this literature here. There
is, however, one point that sometimes gets lost in this literature
that is central to understanding disability policy. We want to
know the change in social welfare from giving an additional dol-
worked out, such as the possibility of capabilities monsters (akin to the utility monster
problem in welfarism), determining the list of capabilities, and determining how trade-
offs are to be made among items in the list and with respect to transfers among individu-
als.
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lar to an individual. We want to know this because we want to
know whether there are benefits to redistributing toward the
disabled.
To explore this issue, note that a welfarist will choose a poli-
cy to maximize a function of individual utilities:
W(x) = W(UI(x), U2(x).... U(x)) (1)
where x describes the relevant state of the world (consumption
for each individual, their work effort, the set of legal rules under
which they operate, etc.), and W is a method of aggregating utili-
ties. For example, W might be equal to the sum of utilities, the
product of utilities, or the lowest utility of any member of society.
The aggregation method reflects how egalitarian or averse to
inequality we are because it can weight individuals differently
depending on their circumstances. For example, the utilitarian
social welfare function defines social welfare as the sum of indi-
vidual utilities. Everyone is weighted equally: a given increase in
utility of an individual increases social welfare the same amount
regardless of whether the individual is rich or poor.6 1 The so-
called Rawlsian maximin social welfare function is equal to the
utility of the least well-off individual in society. 62 Increases in
utility only matter for the worst off individual.
Most public economics models do not take a position on the
optimal degree of aversion to inequality. Instead, welfare econo-
mists use a general version of the social welfare function that
allows aversion to inequality to vary with a parameter. There are
a variety of forms, but a common version is:
uI-f
w=E3 U, /81# (2)
-Zln(ui) 6 = 1
where /3 ranges from zero to infinity. When /3 is equal to zero, this
function becomes utilitarianism. As j8 approaches infinity, the
function approaches maximin. The analyst can then examine
61 Giving a dollar to a rich person, however, will not be the same as giving a dollar to
a poor person because the resulting change in utility will not be the same.
62 Rawls cared about primary goods rather than utility, so the function is Rawlsian
only in a loose interpretation. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard 1999). This
terminology, however faulty, is standard in the public economics literature.
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how policy changes as PJ changes without taking a particular po-
sition on the appropriate level of fl.
The question is how much social welfare increases if we give
an individual an additional dollar. 63 If we give an individual an
additional dollar, the individual will be better off. We measure
how much better off he is by his marginal utility of consumption.
Social welfare then goes up based on the change in social welfare
for the change in that individual's utility. That is, we need to
know the marginal change in social welfare for an individual of a
given utility level. For any given social welfare function, there-
fore, the two factors that matter are marginal utility and abso-
lute utility of that individual. Different social welfare functions
will weigh these differently. A utilitarian social welfare function
weighs all individuals equally, regardless of wealth. Therefore, it
looks only to marginal utility, ignoring the level of utility. A
Rawlsian social welfare function looks only to the level of utility
(of the worst off individual), ignoring marginal utility. Social wel-
fare functions between these extremes will weigh both factors.
It is important to isolate these two factors because we can
imagine disability affecting them differently. For example,
Amartya Sen considers a case where a disability causes someone
to be worse off in a way that makes it difficult for them to become
better off.64 Both the utility level and marginal utility are low for
this individual because of the disability. The reduction in utility
level would point to allocating more resources to the individual,
but the reduction in marginal utility, his ability to use the re-
sources, would point to allocating less. A different disability
might make someone worse off, but the individual could be made
much better off with additional resources. In this case, utility
level decreased but marginal utility increased. Both factors
would point to allocating more resources to the individual. Other
cases are possible as well. Welfarists will differ in how they treat
these cases, depending on their choice of the social welfare func-
tion.
63 In mathematical terms, we take the partial derivative of the social welfare function
with respect to an increment of consumption for an individual. This produces W'(u)u ,
The two factors in the text are W'(u) and u .
64 Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality 16-18 (Oxford 1997). Sen used this example
to argue against utilitarianism. His argument depends on W(u) = 1, and does not apply
to welfarism more generally. Unfortunately, Sen uses his argument to reject not just
utilitarianism but also welfarism more generally, which does not follow.
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B. Optimal Taxation and Screening
Although barely mentioned in the legal literature, it is now
standard in the economics literature to view taxation as an in-
formation or screening problem. 65 This section briefly reviews
how the tax literature models the screening problem. To avoid
repetition of standard economics texts, this section merely touch-
es on the highlights.
In standard tax models, individuals are assumed to vary by
their ability to earn income. The government wants to redistri-
bute to those with lower ability but cannot directly observe who
they are. It can, however, observe labor income, but this is a
function of both ability (represented by the wage rate) and effort
(hours worked and also actual effort during those hours). If a
high tax is imposed on those with high income on the theory that
they are more likely to have high ability, those individuals can
work less and reduce their income, thereby mimicking someone
with low ability. The trick is to find a set of tax rates that best
deal with this trade-off, the desire to redistribute toward those
with lower ability and the problem of high-ability individuals
mimicking.
If we view the problem from behind the veil of ignorance, we
can view it as a trade-off between insurance and incentives. Be-
hind the veil, we would not know which individual in society we
would be. Redistribution toward those with lower abilities can be
seen as insurance against randomly being selected to be a low-
ability individual. Too much insurance, however, distorts incen-
tives. That is, just like with other types of insurance, insurance
against having low ability through redistributive taxation
creates moral hazard. Designing a tax system, therefore, is very
much like designing an optimal insurance policy.66
65 For good summaries, see Matti Tuomala, Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution
(Oxford 1990); Joseph Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New
Welfare Economics, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, Handbook of Public
Economics 91 (Elsevier 1987). For the first article aimed at a legal audience that explains
the tax problem this way, see Strnad, The Progressive Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal
Attributes, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 293 (2004).
Stiglitz introduced the two-type model used here. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and
Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J Pub Econ 213-40 (1982). Joseph Bankman and Thomas
Griffith introduced the optimal tax literature to the legal community but did not explain
it as a screening problem. See Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and
the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal L Rev 1905 (1987).
66 There are, therefore, very close affinities between optimal tax policy and Ronald
Dworkin's insurance approach. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality
of Resources, 10 Phil & Pub Aff 283 (1981).
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It is easiest to understand the nature of the problem by ex-
amining a simplified example, involving a society with only two
types of individuals, those with a high wage and those with a low
wage. Imagine also that their utility is based solely on their con-
sumption and how hard they work, with marginal utility de-
creasing with consumption (each additional unit of consumption
brings less and less utility) and increasing with hours worked. If
we assume that marginal utility is inversely proportionate to
consumption and hours worked, we can use the following com-
monly used utility function to represent the individuals:
ui = ln(ci) + ln(1-ei) (3)
where ci is consumption and ei is hours worked, indexed by indi-
viduals in society. If wages per hour are wi, consumption ci = wiei.
Note that both individuals are identical except with respect to
their wage rates.
Absent taxation, individuals will balance the costs of work
with the benefits of additional consumption. Because the costs of
work increase with each hour and the benefits of consumption
decrease with additional consumption, there will be a point at
which they balance. With this simple utility function, that point
will be to work half the available hours. This is true for both high
wage types and low wage types: they each work the same num-
ber of hours but high-wage individuals consume more because of
their higher wages.
If the government could observe ability types, it could im-
pose a set of taxes and transfers that could not be avoided. It
would simply announce that high-ability types and low-ability
types pay or receive some amount. The government's maximiza-
tion problem in this case is to maximize a function of utilities
subject to the constraint that the sum of taxes and transfers
cannot be less than zero-it cannot give transfers without taxes
to pay for them.
To be concrete, suppose that individuals have 24 hours in a
day, that high-ability individuals can earn $50 per hour, low-
ability individuals can earn $10 per hour, and there are equal
numbers of high and low-ability individuals (for simplicity, one of
each). Without taxes, each individual would work 12 hours.
High-ability individuals would earn $600 per day ($50 x 12) and
have utility of 8.9. Low-ability individuals would earn $120 per
day and have a utility of 7.3. Total utility, the sum of the utilities
of the two types, would be 16.2.
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Suppose the government can observe abilities and that it
maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. In this case, it
can (and would) inform high-ability individuals that they must
pay $400 to the government, regardless of their earnings, and
inform low-ability individuals that they will receive $400 regard-
less of earnings. We plug these taxes and subsidies into the utili-
ty functions to determine work effort and utility levels. The high-
ability person will now work 16 hours a day and have a utility of
8.1. The low-ability person will not work but, because of the $400
transfer, will have a utility of 9.2. Total utility would go up to
17.2, which means that the policy is an improvement over the no-
tax world.67 Note, however, that the high-ability individual now
has lower utility than the low-ability individual, a fact which will
make this plan problematic, as we will see below.
Suppose alternatively, the government uses the Rawlsian or
maximin utility function, so that it maximizes min(ui). The best
the government can do in this case is to require the high-ability
individual to pay $205. The two individuals' utilities are each
8.5. The numbers are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
First Best Utilitarian and Rawlsian Taxes
Transfer Incomes Utility
High Low High Low Sum
No Tax 0 $600 $120 8.9 7.3 16.2
Utilitarian Tax $400 $800 $0 8.1 9.2 17.2
Rawlsian Tax $205 $702 $18 8.5 17.0
Note that the low-ability person is worse off under the Rawl-
sian approach than under a utilitarian approach-redistribution
is more restricted under the Rawlsian approach then under utili-
tarianism in this example. The reason why was alluded to above:
in the utilitarian case, we are willing to make the high-ability
67 More technically, in the utilitarian case, the government's problem is to maximize
Xui subject to Y2xi - Ywiei = 0. We set up a standard Lagrange multiplier and determine
the first order conditions by differentiating. In the case of the log utility function defined
above (Equation 3), we can calculate that consumption for each individual equals la,
where A is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. Labor supply is equal to 1-
l/Xwi. This means that as wages go up, labor supply goes up.
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person worse off than the low-ability person because he is so
much more productive. (Compare the utilities of High and Low in
the two rows. I have underlined the higher utility. As can be
seen, they switch rank order.) To maximize total utility, the
high-ability individuals need to work more hours to generate in-
come used to subsidize the low-ability (and therefore low-
productivity) individuals. In the Rawlsian case, we are not will-
ing to make this trade-off.
This fact, the reversal of utility levels, is what creates the
screening problem. Suppose that the government cannot deter-
mine who is a high-type individual and who is a low-type indi-
vidual but it attempts to impose the tax/transfer scheme just de-
scribed. A high-type individual will, in this case, simply pretend
to be a low-type individual. Rather than working 16 hours a day
and having half his earnings confiscated, the high-type individu-
al will not work at all and claim a $400 per day transfer. His util-
ity from this strategy would be the same as the low-type (9.2),
which is higher than his utility from working 16 hours a day. At
this point, the tax scheme falls apart because nobody is working
and there is no money to transfer to low-ability individuals. We
have tried to offer too much insurance against having low wages
and created a moral hazard problem.
The solution to the incentive problem is to limit the redistri-
bution away from high earners by ensuring that high-ability in-
dividuals are not better off if they masquerade as low-ability in-
dividuals than if they work hard. In technical jargon, we have to
solve the utility maximization problem subject to self-selection
constraints. We want to offer a set of taxes and transfers that
maximizes the amount of redistribution while ensuring that the
high-ability individuals do not masquerade as low-ability indi-
viduals.68
The solution under our numbers is to impose a tax of approx-
imately $192 on those with high incomes and to give a subsidy of
68 Mathematically, we solve the problem subject to the constraint that the utility of
the high wage individuals is at least as high if they choose to work hard as if they choose
to mimic the low-wage individuals. In symbols:
ln(cH) + ln(1-eH) > ln(cL) + ln(l-wLeL/wH) (4)
The left hand side is utility of a high wage individual if he works the high number of
hours, ell. The right hand side is utility of a high wage individual if he earns the same
income as L. Note that on the right hand side, the labor provided is equal to the hours
needed by the high-ability individual to produce the income of the low-ability individual.
We then maximize social welfare subject to the two constraints, net revenue and the
incentive constraint.
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the same amount to those with low incomes. Utility for high-
ability/income individuals is 8.53 and the utility of low-
ability/income individuals is 8.49. Total utility is 17, which is less
than in the unconstrained case. The inability to observe wages or
ability types, and the corresponding self-selection constraints
reduces redistribution. Total social welfare is correspondingly
reduced from the potential of 17.2 to 17.69
TABLE 2
First Best and Second Best Utilitarian Taxes
Transfer Pre-tax Incomes Utility
High Low High Low Sum
No Tax 0 $600 $120 8.9 7.3 16.2
First Best Tax $400 $800 $0 8.1 9.2 17.2
Second Best $192 $696 $24 8.53 8.49 17
Tax
The real world has more than two types of individuals. We
can extend the example by adding a third, middle type. The
analysis is similar. We continue to want to redistribute down-
ward, from high to middle and low, and from middle to low. The
incentive constraint on the high-ability individuals, however, is
now relative to the after-tax wages of middle-income earners.
Thus, it binds at a higher level; we cannot reduce the high-type
individuals' after-tax wages to below a higher number, restrict-
ing redistribution more than in the two-type case. That is, with
only low types and high types, the package offered to the high
type could be pretty bad and they still might not want to mimic
low types. With middle types, the package cannot be as bad, re-
stricting the ability to redistribute from the high type.
The most difficult case is where there are a very large num-
ber of individuals, approximated by a continuous distribution.
69 Note that the information problem also has the potential to confound social policies
based on non-welfarist objectives. Suppose, for example, that we have an egalitarian
norm of providing equality of opportunity, resources, or some other goal. Unless identical
resources are provided for all individuals, we will need information to sort individuals
into different categories. For example, if we think equality of resources means that we
must take into account differential starting points or some other criteria that differen-
tiates individuals, we must have information about the relevant criteria. Absent policies
that are consistent with self-selection constraints, there will be a mimicking problem.
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This was the case originally analyzed by Mirrlees. 70 There is no
closed-form solution for the optimal tax rates, and even the first
order conditions for the optimal tax rates are sufficiently ugly
that it is not worth replicating them here. 71 A standard approach
to determining the optimal tax schedule is to use simulations.
There are two factors that we can isolate from the formulas that
are worth mentioning here.
The first is the trade-off between inframarginal and margin-
al rates. Suppose that the tax schedule is set optimally, and con-
sider a small increase in the marginal tax rate (from optimal) at
some income level. For example, consider raising the marginal
tax rate on income between $50,000 and $51,000. There will be
two offsetting effects. First, individuals at that income level will
face an increased tax rate at the margin, and, therefore, there
will be an additional distortion of their labor effort. Second, indi-
viduals above that income level will face no additional distortion
(the marginal rates they face stay the same) but will pay addi-
tional taxes because of the higher rates that apply at lower in-
come. (Individuals below that income level are unaffected.) To
illustrate, think about an increase in the current 15 percent tax
bracket. Those in that bracket face an increased marginal rate.
Those above it face the same marginal rate but pay more taxes.
The optimal structure balances these two effects. The reason this
matters for disability is that it means that the shape of the in-
come distribution matters; when considering the tax rate at a
given income level, we need to know how many individuals are at
that level and how many are above that level. Below, I will con-
sider the possibility of a separate tax schedule for the disabled. If
the distribution of income is different, the shape of the schedule
will be different.
Second, the marginal tax rate depends on the marginal con-
tribution of an individual's consumption to social welfare. This is
the same notion discussed above, the product of an individual's
marginal utility of consumption and the weight given in social
welfare for an increase in that individual's utility. The higher
this term, all else equal, the lower the marginal tax rates. Thus,
if an individual has high marginal utility of consumption or a low
70 J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev
Econ Stud 175 (1971).
71 See Louis Kaplow, Taxation, in A. Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell, eds,
Handbook of Law and Economics, equation 3.9 (North Holland 2007).
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absolute level of utility, marginal tax rates will, all else being
equal, be lower.
C. The AtkinsonlStiglitz Income Tax Only Result
There is one additional important aspect of the optimal tax
literature we need to review before adding disabilities. An impor-
tant question in examining the tax structure is whether commo-
dities as well as income should be taxed.72 For example, might we
want a tax on luxury goods on the theory that such a tax would
be progressive? Or might we want to follow "Ramsey" tax formu-
las and impose taxes on highly inelastic goods?
The standard answer, due to Anthony Atkinson and Joseph
Stiglitz, is that a tax on commodities is not generally a good
idea.73 Their argument was technical, but the intuition for the
result, developed most extensively by Louis Kaplow, is
straightforward. 74 Suppose that there is a tax on income (labor
income, not Haig-Simons income) and consider a luxury tax. The
luxury tax will have three effects. First, it will have a distribu-
tive effect -the wealthier who purchase luxuries will pay more
tax. Second, it will have an effect on the incentives to become
wealthy (that is, to work hard). Becoming wealthy will be less
beneficial because the things a wealthy person might do with
their money are now more limited. Finally, it will distort the
choice of purchases made by those considering buying luxuries.
Compare that to an increase in the progressivity of the in-
come tax that raises the same amount of money from the weal-
thy. There would be the same distributive effect and the same
reduction in the incentives to become wealthy, but we would
eliminate the distortion in the choice of goods purchased by the
wealthy. The increase in the progressivity of the income tax is a
superior option. Legal readers will be familiar with this result as
the Kaplow and Shavell claim that legal rules should be effi-
72 It is important to note that "income" here means labor income, not Haig-Simons
income. Indeed, the AtkinsonlStiglitz result implies that Haig-Simons income tax is not
desirable. See Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Con-
sumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan L Rev 1413 (2006).
73 Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct
Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J Pub Econ 55, 74 (1976) ("[Wihere the utility function is
separable between labor and all commodities, no indirect taxes need to be employed. In
this case, the use of consumption of particular commodities as a screening device offers no
benefit.").
74 Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation even when Income
Taxation is not Optimal, 6 J Pub Econ 1235 (2006).
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cient. 75 The claim that legal rules should be efficient is a direct
implication of the tax result: an inefficient legal rule is much like
an excise tax on the activity subject to the legal rule.
To see how this might apply to disabilities, suppose that in-
dividuals with disabilities are identical to all other individuals
except that their income is, on average, lower. The right way to
approach disabilities in this case would be through the income
tax. Because the differences among individuals are related to the
ability to earn income, redistribution should be along this dimen-
sion.
George Akerlof famously studied an example of this sort, giv-
ing it the label "tagging."76 The idea was that the government
can identify some trait of an individual that indicates that earn-
ings ability is lower. This "tag" helps differentiate individuals
with low ability from mimickers with high ability. The tag, in
other words, can help solve the incentive constraint by adding
additional information. We should, therefore, use the tag to set
tax schedules. Thus, we might imagine, in this case, having a
separate tax schedule or something similar, such as a deduction
or credit. Based on the Mirrlees-type considerations described
above, the shape of the separate tax schedule will be different
because, by assumption, the distribution of ability is different for
the tagged groups. 77
We can summarize this conclusion with:
Result #1: If disability affects only the ability to earn
income, the optimal result is to adjust the income tax
schedule, possibly by having a separate schedule based on
observable features (tags).
75 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 669 (1994) (stating regimes
with inefficient legal rules can be replaced with an efficient legal rule so that every per-
son is made better off).
76 George A. Akerloff, The Economics of 'Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income
Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Training, 68 Am Econ Rev 8 (1978). See also
Charles Blackorby and David Donaldson, Information and Intergroup Transfers, 84 Am
Econ Rev Papers & Proc 440 (1994); Ritva Immonen, et al, Tagging and Taxing: The
Optimal Uses of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer
Schemes, 65 Economica 179 (1998); Michael Keen, Needs and Targeting, 102 Econ J 67
(1992); Robin Boadway and Pierre Pestieau, Tagging and Redistributive Taxation,
Queen's Econ Department, Working Paper No 1071 (2006). Louis Kaplow, The Theory of
Taxation and Public Economics 99-103 (Princeton 2008), provides a summary of this
literature.
7 Kaplow, Taxation (cited in note 71) (providing an extensive discussion on the shape
of the tax schedules).
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The underlying reason that Atkinson and Stiglitz find that it
is best to use a pure income tax to redistribute is that individuals
in their model vary only along a single dimension, the ability to
produce income. That is, their utility function looks like the ones
used in the example above: individuals vary by their wage rate
but are otherwise identical. A natural implication of this is that
we can only differentiate individuals on the basis of earnings,
and, therefore, no commodity tax is desirable. Adding disability
is akin to allowing individuals to vary in a second way: people
vary in the ability to earn wages and with respect to the disabili-
ty (say to walk, hear, etc.). Once individuals vary in more than
one dimension, the optimal tax is likely to involve more than one
dimension as well.78 It is this problem that I turn to now.
IV. A WELFARIST APPROACH TO DISABILITY
The key factor in the analysis is the extent to which disabili-
ty is observable. I will argue that the Atkinson-Stiglitz result
applies to disabilities that are observable, and, absent other rea-
sons for in-kind redistribution, to the extent disability is observ-
able, disability policy should be done through the income tax. If
disability is not observable, disability status cannot be used to
make adjustments to the income tax schedule. Instead, if redi-
stribution toward the disabled is desirable, we need to do so
through a screening mechanism that allows us to sort the dis-
abled and those that would mimic the disabled. This Part illu-
78 There is a modest but growing literature examining the case where there is more
than one dimension of difference. See Robin Boadway and Michael Keen, Public Goods,
Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation, 34 Intl Econ Rev 463 (1993); Boadway, et al,
4 J Pub Econ Theory 475 (cited in note 10); Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet, 42 Intl Econ
Rev 781 (cited in note 10); Kaplow, NBER Working Paper 14170 (cited in note 10); Mau-
rice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau and Maria Racionero, Optimal Redistribution when Work-
ers are Indistinguishable, 36 Can J Econ 911 (2003); James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax
Theory: A Synthesis, 6 J Pub Econ 327 (1976); Saez, 83 J Pub Econ 217 (cited in note 10).
One of the problems the economics literature has had in dealing with exceptions to
the Atkinson and Stiglitz result is that if people vary in more than one dimension, the
math becomes intractable. The reason for this is that the incentive constraints can run in
many directions. Consider a simple society with two types along each of two dimensions,
wage and disability. There are four types of individuals (high-wage not disabled, high-
wage disabled, low-wage not disabled, and low-wage disabled). We cannot tell whether
redistribution should go from high-wage disabled to low-wage not disabled and we cannot
tell who will mimic whom. Even in this simple, four-type case, the math is difficult. See
Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet, 42 Intl Econ Rev 781 (cited in note 10). More general cases
have yet to be solved.
I will generally ignore this issue for now. That is, I will assume that disability
policy does not alter the incentive constraints for the income tax. This is not likely to be
true: special treatment of disabilities probably would alter the incentive constraints.
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strates these points, first describing the reasoning generally and
then using a simple example to illustrate.
A. Disability is Observable
If disability can be observed, policy toward the disabled is
best implemented through adjustments to the income tax sche-
dule. To see why this is so, recall the basic Atkinson-Stiglitz in-
tuition: if individuals vary only by their ability to earn wages,
the best way to differentiate individuals is through taxes on
wages. The key to the argument was the assumption that indi-
viduals vary only by their ability to earn wages.
Suppose that individuals vary in two ways: the ability to
earn wages and by disability, which affects utility in some other
way, such as increasing needs (and may also affect wage rates).
Suppose further that disability can be observed. Because disabil-
ity can be observed, we can divide the population into categories,
such as disabled or not, or into various categories of disability.
Within each category, all individuals would be the same other
than with respect to the ability to earn wages. Therefore, within
each category, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result returns, and within
each category, redistribution should happen only with an income
tax. But if each category only uses an income tax, the entire sys-
tem also only uses an income tax, and hence the result: to the
extent that if disability is observable, the best way to redistri-
bute is solely with an income tax.79
Redistribution happens among the categories through the
relative tax rate schedules (including grants or negative taxes).
For example, we might have deductions or credits for various
observable disabilities or potentially, a separate tax schedule
altogether. Thus, suppose that the identified category of the dis-
abled were the same as the nondisabled except that they had
higher needs. At a given level of income, their marginal utility
would be higher and, therefore, we would expect to see lower tax
rates on the disabled, thereby taking into account the higher
needs. Within each category, the income tax is pure, measuring
only income, but across categories tax rates will vary by disabili-
ty status. Note that this means that traditional tax-focused hori-
zontal equity norms would be violated; individuals with the same
income would be treated differently depending on disability sta-
7' This point has been made in a general context by Boadway and Pestieau, Indirect
Taxation and Redistribution at 387 (cited in note 10); Louis Kaplow, 6 J Pub Econ 1235
(cited in note 74).
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tus. Note also that while the income tax looks pure within each
category, overall there will be deductions, credits, or alternative
tax schedules for different categories of individuals, so that over-
all, the tax system will not look like a pure income tax.
The nature of the tax adjustments will depend on the effects
of a given disability. There are (at least) three relevant effects.
First, disability might affect income. As noted, the disabled tend
to have lower income than the rest of the population. The tax
rate schedule for a given category would reflect the relative in-
come distribution within that category.80
Second, disability might affect marginal utility at a given
level of income. For example, if disability increases marginal util-
ity by, say, increasing needs, tax rates will tend to be lower for
the disabled. Third and finally, it might change absolute levels of
utility. If disability lowers absolute utility, the tax system will, to
the extent the social welfare function cares about absolute utili-
ty, have lower rates.81 A reasonable reading of the stylized facts
given above is that disability lowers overall utility and increases
marginal utility by increasing needs. To the extent this is true,
the relative tax schedules will favor the disabled.
It is not clear the extent to which disabilities will be observ-
able. To be observable in the relevant sense, we have to know the
effect of the disability on an individual's utility. Medical diagnos-
es, even if accurate, may not give enough information. For exam-
ple, if individuals with given diagnoses have dramatically differ-
ent needs, we need to be able to observe these needs and not
merely the gross diagnoses.
Without taking any strong views about whether particular
conditions can be observed, we can see rough divisions from a
perusal of the list of major disabilities. Backaches, by far the
most prevalent disability, may be very hard to observe in many
cases. Diabetes will be easier to observe, although the extent that
it imposes limitations or increases needs may be harder to ob-
serve, which means that detailed tax adjustments may not be
feasible. Similar issues arise with various forms of cardiovascu-
lar disease (numbers 3, 4, and 5 on the list). Mental health condi-
tions will vary dramatically in how hard they are to observe with
the type of condition and also with the state of medical technolo-
80 Thus, high marginal tax rates on low income disabled will be less desirable than
high marginal tax rates on nondisabled low income individuals because those rates will
be inframarginal with respect to a smaller population.
11 In particular, we want to know W(u)u. Social welfare functions will weight the
two factors differently, depending on their curvature.
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gy. Vision and hearing problems, however, are likely to be rela-
tively easy to observe.
There is an important caveat to the conclusion that the in-
come tax system is the best way to implement disability policy
for observable disabilities. As discussed in more detail in Part V,
if a good desired by the disabled has public goods aspects, in-kind
provision of that good may be optimal. Thus, for example, a sin-
gle individual would not purchase curb cuts or other elements of
public architecture because they benefit many. Discrimination
laws, status, and respect may have public goods aspects. Similar-
ly, some accommodations may act as public goods. To the extent
these items are public goods, direct provision rather than redi-
stribution through the tax system may be desirable, even in the
case of observable disabilities. Part V discusses some of these
issues.
We can summarize this discussion with:
Result #2: To the extent disability is observable, the ap-
propriate policy is to use a separate income tax schedule
for the disabled. Redistribution is implicit in the relative
tax rates. This conclusion will not hold to the extent in-
kind redistribution is otherwise desirable, say, because
there are public goods aspects to certain items.
B. Disability is Not Observable
Many disabilities (or more precisely, the effects of many dis-
abilities) will not be observable. This means that providing a
separate tax schedule that implicitly redistributes towards the
disabled will not work. If we cannot tell who is whom, indivi-
duals would be able to choose the more favorable tax schedule.
For example, suppose we allowed individuals with back pain to
deduct expenses associated with their pain, such as taking cabs,
having groceries delivered, or purchasing expensive, more sup-
portive furniture. If we cannot accurately determine who actual-
ly has back pain (and the needs associated with back pain),
healthy individuals who would like these items will claim to have
back problems and take unjustified deductions. In economic
terms, if we cannot observe disability, providing additional re-
sources will not be incentive compatible. Just like in the basic
income tax case where we had to derive a tax schedule that
screened by income, we need to come up with a screening me-
chanism for disabilities that are not observable.
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An initial question is whether this is a serious problem. Will
the nondisabled claim to be disabled to gain benefits? This is a
difficult issue to get a handle on because if disability is unob-
servable, we cannot easily tell who is truly disabled and who is
mimicking. By definition, the problem is hard to study. We have
to look for indirect evidence. Moreover, the answer will depend
on the type of disability and the size of the benefits.
The evidence that I have found indicates that mimicking will
often be a problem. Evidence from the United States is not clear
because the major disability programs tend to be national, which
means that there is little regional variation to exploit in a study.
Nevertheless, there is a high correspondence between the growth
of disability insurance and withdrawal from the labor force for
prime-age men.8 2 In addition, litigation over disability claims is
substantial, which is potentially indicative of mimicking.83 Ab-
sent other explanations, these data are indicative of mimicking.
In another study, an economist used a change in Quebec's dis-
ability insurance scheme relative to the rest of Canada to meas-
ure the effect of disability benefits on work, finding a modest but
real effect.8 4 Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester provide extensive
but anecdotal evidence of mimicking of learning disabilities.8 5
Perhaps the most famous example is largely anecdotal, the so-
called Dutch disease. The Netherlands had Europe's most gener-
ous disability policy and also, by far, the highest percentage of
disabled in the EU. Growth rates of the disability roles in the
1970's were unsustainable. Although we do not have a good
event study to determine the exact effects, reforms of the pro-
82 See Donald 0. Parsons, Disability Insurance and Male Labor Force Participation:
A Response to Haveman and Wolfe, 92 J Pol Econ 542, 547 Figure 1 (1984) (concluding
"[s]ubstantial evidence has accumulated that the labor force participation of middle-aged
males is sensitive to both the characteristics of the social security disability system and to
labor market alternatives"). Alan B. Krueger and Bruce Myer, Labor Supply Effects of
Social Insurance, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, Handbook of Public
Economics, 2327, 2380 (North Holland 2002) (summarizing similar evidence and drawing
similar conclusions).
83 See Gooloo S. Wunderlich, Dorothy P. Rice, and Nicole L. Amado, eds, The Dynam-
ics of Disability: Measuring and Monitoring Disability for Social Security Programs (Na-
tional Academies 2002); Frank S. Block, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Securi-
ty's Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 Cornell L Rev 189 (2007).
84 Jonathan Gruber, Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply, 108 J Pol Econ
1162 (2000) (finding an elasticity of 0.28 - 0.36).
85 Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal
Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities (1997). Kelman and Lester discuss the
difficulties in classifying children with learning disabilities, see id at 17-36, and the in-
teresting case of mimicking to get extra time for law school exams. See id at 193.
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gram appear to have led to reduced rates of growth. 6 Although it
would be nice to know more about this issue, ignoring mimicking
would, I believe, be naive.
To screen, we need to find items that will be used more by
the truly disabled than by mimickers. For example, suppose that
there is a drug that costs $100 that only helps individuals with a
particular, unobservable disability. If we tried to give individuals
with that disability $100 of cash (so that they could purchase the
drug), mimickers would also ask for the money, and we would be
faced with the choice of giving nobody the money or giving both
the disabled and the mimickers the money. With a limited bud-
get and everyone claiming the money, there would be less for
those who actually need it. If alternatively, we redistribute using
the drug, there would be no advantage to mimickers, and we
could target the redistribution more effectively.
To screen through the provision of particular goods, we can
either provide the goods directly (in-kind provision) or we can use
commodity taxes and subsidies. In-kind provision is simply equal
to a 100 percent subsidy. In either case, direct in-kind provision
or taxes and subsidies, it has to be the case that you cannot resell
the good absent the subsidy. Thus, if the government provides a
free widget worth $100 to the disabled and those who receive the
widget can resell it for $100, the effect is the same as giving cash.
Mimickers who otherwise would not want widgets would claim
them and resell them. Thus, in-kind provision to promote screen-
ing must look paternalistic in the sense that the government in-
sists on consumption of a certain good. In reality it is not pater-
nalistic: the government is not insisting on consumption of the
good because of a claim about superior knowledge or inappro-
priate behavior.
The interesting thing about use of in-kind provision for
screening is that it will often be desirable to provide more of the
good than individuals would choose freely (making it look even
more paternalistic). That is, there will generally be inefficiently
high consumption of screening goods.
To see why inefficiently high consumption of screening de-
vices is desirable, I have reproduced a graph used by Albert Ni-
chols and Richard Zeckhauser to illustrate the point.8 7
86 For articles examining the Dutch disability program, see Leo J. M. Aarts, Richard
V. Burkhauser, and Philip R. de Jong, eds, Curing the Dutch Disease: An International
Perspective on Disability Policy Reform (Avebury 1996).
87 Albert Nichols and Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers through Restrictions
on Recipients, 72 Am Econ Rev 372, 375 Figure 2 (1982).
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XA XD
Quantity of In-Kind Good
The graph charts the utility functions of two individuals, A
and D, D being disabled. Their utility is graphed as a function of
the consumption of some good X. Absent any government inter-
vention, the disabled individual would choose to consume more of
the good than the nondisabled-XD is higher than XA. Suppose
that we attempt to use in-kind distribution of the good to redi-
stribute toward the disabled. Provision of any amount up to XD
would be efficient as it would not change the disabled individu-
al's behavior. Suppose, however, that if we provide XD of the
good, the nondisabled would choose to mimic. Although A's utili-
ty is lower when consuming that amount rather than XA, free
provision might make it worthwhile. Consider what happens,
however, if we increase the in-kind provision beyond XD. D's util-
ity goes down, but at least initially by very little. This is a conse-
quence of D being near his optimum amount. A's utility, howev-
er, goes down by a lot. Thus, by increasing the provision of X by
some amount beyond the efficient amount, we can hurt the mi-
micker more than the target. If A is sufficiently deterred and
ceases mimicking because of the change, resources are freed up
which can be used to redistribute further. In effect, efficiency is
lost but targeting is improved, creating a net improvement in
overall welfare.
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There are at least three legal implications. First, the ac-
commodation requirement in the ADA is an in-kind provision of
goods and, therefore, might be viewed as a screening device.8 An
implication would be that we should be more willing to provide
accommodations that have the right attributes to act as a screen-
ing device: accommodations that are unlikely to be desired by the
nondisabled should be preferred. This is common sense. If an
individual claims to have a disability that cannot be observed
and also desires an accommodation that someone without the
disability would want, we are likely to be suspicious. Thus, if
someone claims to have a backache and asked for a luxurious
and expensive chair, we might worry that the individual is a
mimicker. If either the disability can be observed or the accom-
modation indicates that the person truly has the disability, we
are likely to feel more comfortable. Moreover, given the choice
among accommodations, employers should be allowed to choose
the one that acts as a better screening device.
A second implication is that we should want over-
consumption of accommodations because this can enhance
screening. Thus, many commentators have attempted to deter-
mine whether accommodations of various sorts are efficient.89
Although it might be relevant information, efficiency is not the
appropriate test for whether they are socially desirable. Ineffi-
cient oversupply of accommodations might often be appropriate.
Finally, when we consider direct subsidies for certain goods
rather than accommodations, we need to try to understand what
types of goods or activities are good candidates to be used as
screening devices. They need to be goods that are differentially
consumed by individuals with a given disability. For example,
certain types of medical care may be far more beneficial to the
disabled than to others, so subsidizing this care may be desira-
ble.
We can summarize the discussion in this section with the
following:
88 This is not an explanation for private as opposed to public funding of the accom-
modation, an issue not discussed here. There may also be alternative explanations for
accommodation mandates.
89 See generally Sherwin Rosen, Disablity Accommodation and the Labor Market, in
Carolyn L. Weaver, ed, Disability and Work: Incentives, Rights, and Opportunities 18
(American Enterprise Institute 1991). See also Issacharoff and Nelson, 79 NC L Rev 307
(cited in note 9); Jolls, 115 Harv L Rev 642 (cited in note 9); Karlan and Rutherglen, 46
Duke L J 1 (cited in note 9); Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 (cited in note 1); Verkerke, 50
UCLA L Rev 903 (cited in note 9).
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Result #3: If disability cannot be observed, redistribution
toward the disabled is limited because of screening prob-
lems. Redistribution can take place through subsidies or
direct provision of goods that are more likely to be con-
sumed by the disabled.
Result #4: Inefficiently high consumption of screening
goods may be desirable where such high consumption im-
proves targeting. If the accommodation mandate of the
ADA is a screening mechanism, evaluation of the
mandate should not be based solely on efficiency.
C. Example
This section works through the above analysis using a sim-
ple example. To keep things as simple as possible, I will assume
that there are only two types of individuals, the disabled and the
nondisabled. Moreover, I will assume that the income tax is pri-
marily responsible for redistributing among different levels of
income so that the relevant individuals for our purposes can be
considered to have the same levels of income. This eliminates
some important aspects of the problem but also greatly simplifies
the presentation. Finally, I will assume that disability increases
needs for certain types of consumption. In particular, I will as-
sume that utility takes the form:
U = ln(ci) + ln(di - 6i) (5)
where d and 6 represents consumption of a class of items that
individuals with some type of disability are more likely to con-
sume than the general population, such as various assistive de-
vices or services. For ease of discussion, I will refer to this class
of items generically as medical services with the understanding
that this term is both too broad and too narrow. 90 The variable 6
90 For example, the blind may consume more Braille books, which are not medical
services. The nondisabled may consume many medical services. The term is merely a
placeholder and has no particular implication about the particular items that are equiva-
lent to d in the real world.
Marchand, Pestieau and Racionero, 36 Can J Econ 911 (cited in note 78), use a
similar form of utility to model disability. They model utility (using the symbols used
here), as
U = c + v(d-6) - A ip(e)
The major difference is that utility is quasi-linear in consumption. Linearity in nonmedi-
cal consumption means that they cannot use a utilitarian social welfare function without
eliminating the distributional component of policy. They weight the disutility of labor
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represents additional need for that type of item. Thus, an indi-
vidual with a disability will have a higher 6 than other individu-
als. That is, disability is modeled here as solely an additional
need for a particular type of consumption. Otherwise all individ-
uals are alike. Note in particular that there is no income and no
work effort in the utility function-I am assuming the relevant
individuals being analyzed have the same income and wage
rates.9
1
With this utility function, individuals will set c = d - 6. That
is, they satisfy their needs and then split their consumption be-
tween the two items. For example, if total resources are $100 and
6 is $20, they would spend the $20 on that item and then split
the remaining $80 in half. The result would be $60 on d (consist-
ing of the $20 for needs and half of the remaining $80) and $40
on c. As 6 increases, utility decreases and marginal utility in-
creases, holding income constant. Thus, regardless of the social
welfare function chosen, a welfarist would want to redistribute
toward the disabled. 92
1. When disability is observable.
Assume that the government can perfectly observe disabili-
ty, say through medical examinations or similar procedures.
Note that with the assumed utility function, this means that the
government can observe 6. If the government can observe 6, it
can achieve a first best solution.
Consider a utilitarian government. It wants to maximize the
sum of utilities subject to the budget constraint (that total con-
sumption equals a fixed amount). This means that the govern-
higher for disabled individuals by a factor of A, which I omit as non-welfarist.
91 This is very stylized. If we can observe both 6 and income, we could make infer-
ences about wage rates and, therefore, we would not want to treat individuals with the
same income and different 6's the same purely along the income dimension.
92 One criticism of this utility function is that it also reflects individuals with expen-
sive tastes. Someone with expensive tastes would, with the same income as others, have
lower utility-their "needs" are higher. Unless we recognize expensive tastes, which we
normally do not, we should not be willing to use this form of the utility function for the
disabled.
One possible answer is that ideally we would take all differences into account but
there is no easy way to identify expensive tastes: if we were to subsidize meals at fancy
restaurants for gourmands, everyone would claim to be a gourmand. Another answer is
that we can make a prior judgment to recognize the needs of the disabled and not gour-
mands. We do not recognize all differences, and there will always be a judgment about
which ones to include. A claim that needs related to disability should be recognized is no
different than recognizing wage differentials as relevant, an assumption widely adopted
in the literature.
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ment will set post-needs consumption the same for all individu-
als. Thus, for any i and j, the government will set ci = cj, and
di - 6i = dj- 6j. As 6i increases relative to 6j, the government would
allocate more to individual i. That is, the government, if it could,
would allocate relatively more consumption to the disabled, satis-
fying their relatively higher needs first and then equalizing post-
needs consumption.
To illustrate, suppose that the two types of individuals are H
and L, with H having higher needs (that is, is disabled). Assume
that each individual has 100 of resources (say, each earning the
same after-income tax wages). Suppose that 6 H = 75 and 6L = 5.
Absent any intervention, each individual would spend their first
dollars on their needs and then split their post-needs dollars be-
tween the two types of consumption. Thus, L would spend 47.50
on c and 52.50 (47.50 + 5.00) on d. H would spend 12.50 on c and
the rest on d. Total utility would be 12.77, consisting of 7.72 of
utility to L and 5.05 utility to H.
Suppose that the government set post-needs consumption
equal. It would use 80 to satisfy needs, giving 75 to H and 5 to L,
and then split the rest evenly. Thus, it would give 60 of the re-
maining 120 to each. Overall, L would get 65 and H would get
135. The utility of each would be 6.80 and total utility would be
13.60, a significant improvement. The following table summariz-
es:
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TABLE 3




Consumption of c 47.5 12.5
Consumption of d 52.5 87.5
Utility 7.72 5.05 12.77
Disability is Observable
Consumption of c 30 30
Consumption of d 35 105
Utility 6.80 6.80 13.60
2. When disability is unobservable.
If the government cannot tell who is disabled, the nondis-
abled would benefit by claiming to be disabled. In the example,
both types of individual consume 30 of c but the disabled got 105
of d compared to 35 for the nondisabled. By claiming to be dis-
abled, an individual can keep the 30 of c but increase d to 105.
The same holds in the more general case of the differing tax
schedules. As long as more consumption of d increases utility,
claiming to be disabled is an attractive strategy. Therefore, the
allocation is not incentive compatible.
The optimal policy depends on the information available to
government. To illustrate the importance of information, I will
consider two cases. In the first case, the government can offer
incentive compatible packages of c and d. For example, the dis-
abled will prefer more of d and less of c. Because there are two
types of individuals, the government will offer two packages: one
that offers relatively more of d and one that relatively offers
more of c. The disabled will, all things equal, prefer the former,
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the nondisabled the latter. This difference can be used to sepa-
rate the different types of individuals. This policy, however, re-
quires the government to base the price of c on purchases of d
(and vice versa). If only anonymous purchases can be observed or
if individuals can cheat the system by using surrogate buyers,
the policy may not be feasible. I will consider a second case,
therefore, in which the government's only option is anonymous
commodity taxes, which means that the tax or subsidy on a par-
ticular good is independent of purchases of other goods. In both
cases, the government can do better than laissez faire but not
nearly as well as in the first best case. The "packages" case does
better than the commodity tax case, as should not be surprising,
because the government is assumed to have access to more in-
formation.
Begin with the case where the government can offer two
packages. Continue to assume that there are two types, H and L
(with H having higher needs for d). One package will be intended
for H and one for L. We want to offer a package to H that makes
him better off but is not as attractive to L as the other package.
This will allow some limited redistribution toward H.
Suppose that the government were to offer individuals two
choices: individuals can either consume 16 units of c and 100
units of d or they can consume 39 units of c and 44 units of d.
The total is still 200 units of consumption, thereby staying with-
in the resource constraint. The first package has more total con-
sumption (116 compared to 84) but is far more skewed toward d.
A disabled person strongly prefers the first package. (Indeed,
he could not live on the second package as basic needs for d ex-
ceed the amount offered.) A nondisabled person is indifferent:
utility is 7.35 for either package. Thus, the nondisabled person
has no incentive to mimic the disabled and the set of packages is
incentive compatible. (To eliminate the case of exact indifference,
we can shift .01 of a unit more to the nondisabled.)
Total utility under this allocation is 13.36, which is far bet-
ter than the laissez faire case (total utility 12.77) but not as good
as when disability was observable (total utility 13.6). Note also
that in the observable disability case, total consumption by the
disabled was 135, while in this case, the total is only 116. Infor-
mation constraints restrict the ability to redistribute. The table
below summarizes:
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TABLE 4







Total (H picks 1, L picks 2) 13.36
Note a subtlety in the example. We started by assuming
equal incomes, so H and L each had 100. We offered a set of
packages to L, however, such that he would prefer only 84 rather
than 116. Thus, we were able to redistribute from L to H, im-
proving welfare. Also, note that the package designed for the dis-
abled had more of d and less of c than he would choose were he
given a cash grant of the same value. That is, the disabled person
was given a total of 116. With needs of 75 and total income of
116, that person would have split consumption into 21 of c and
96 of d. We force him to consume more of d but by doing so, we
are able to redistribute more in total, increasing his welfare.
Thus, if the same total wealth of 116 were offered in a more nat-
ural split of 21 and 96, the package would not be incentive com-
patible because the nondisabled person would also prefer the
package. Inefficiently high consumption of medical services is
desirable in this case.
As noted, the information requirements on the government
in this case are strong. The government must be able to base the
price of c on amounts of d purchased (and vice versa). This may
be possible. The variable c stands for total nonmedical consump-
tion. The government then need only give a subsidy for d based
on purchases of d and total consumption. If there is more than
one type of subsidized consumption, however, the schedule would
be more complex. The subsidy for d would depend not only on c
but on consumption other items, d', d", etc.
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The second case requires a much less elaborate tax struc-
ture. In this case, the government merely sets a general tax or
subsidy on each commodity that is available to anyone who pur-
chases the commodity, regardless of income or of consumption of
other items. The government's problem is to set taxes and subsi-
dies for c and d to maximize total utility subject to a constraint
that the sum of taxes and subsidies equal zero (in a world where
people set their behavior based on the taxes and subsidies).
There is no incentive constraint here because the same package
of prices is offered to everyone. Therefore, L cannot mimic H. In-
stead, L just maximizes given the prices.
Intuitively, what we will want to do is to subsidize medical
services (d) and tax everything else (c) because doing so will help
those with higher needs. This will distort behavior, creating inef-
ficient choices between c and d. Doing so, however, helps H be-
cause medical services are cheaper.
Consider the running example, where H and L each have
100 of resources and the only difference is that H has needs of 75
and L has needs of only 5. Recall that without any taxes or trans-
fers, total utility was 12.77, and with full information and direct
transfers, we could get total utility up to 13.60.
Suppose we impose a tax of 40 percent on the price of c and
use the money raised to subsidize d. The revenue neutral subsidy
for d, given that both H and L will choose their allocations based
on prices, is 12 percent. Because L purchases more of c than H
does (and correspondingly less of d than H does), this scheme
hurts L and helps H. In particular, L's utility goes down but I-fs
goes up by more. Total utility in fact goes up from 12.77 to 12.99.
This is an improvement over the base case with no taxes, but not
nearly as good as the case with full information (where total util-
ity was 13.6). It is also not as good as the "packages" case (where
taxes on one item were allowed to be based on purchases of other
items)-in that case, we managed to get total utility up to about
13.36. The table below summarizes.
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TABLE 5
Redistribution through Commodity Taxes
C D Totals
Tax/Subsidy 40% -12% 0 (in revenue)
L 47.8 (after-tax 52.2 UL 7.53 (-0.2 over
spending) laissez faire)
H 17 83 UH 5.46 (0.41 over
laissez faire)
Utility (sum of L and H using standard 12.99 (0.214 over
utility function) laissez faire)
The examples illustrate how the ability to observe disability
is a key variable. The total utility in each of the cases considered
are as follows:
Laissez faire: 12.77
Simple commodity taxes: 12.99
Complex commodity taxes: 13.36
Full information: 13.60
Information constraints significantly reduce the ability of
the government to get to the best case. Thus, moving from the
simple commodity taxes to either the more complex schedule or
to full information allows a large improvement in social welfare.
V. COMMENTS
This Part provides additional comments and extensions of
the discussion in Part IV above. It discusses how the analysis
interacts with the social model, how the possibility of private
disability insurance affects the analysis, and the issue of obser-
vation of disabilities.
A. Interaction with the Social Model
Policy prescriptions based on the social model tend to have
two attributes. First, they tend to focus on changing the social
environment to make it more accessible to individuals with vari-
ous impairments or traits. Second, they often focus on issues of
autonomy and status-tenBroek and Matson's rejection of obe-
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dience or starvation. Both can be viewed as distribution of goods
in kind (keeping in mind the caveat in the introduction about the
use of the terms "redistribution" or "transfers"-it is not redistri-
bution to give someone equal status).
The usual presumption in welfarism is that cash transfers
are preferred because individuals have better knowledge of their
preferences than do the policy designers. There are, however, a
number of standard reasons to favor in-kind distribution. First,
as noted above, if disability is not observable, in-kind provision
can act as a screening device because accommodations can be
designed to target particular disabilities. We should, therefore,
be more willing to provide accommodations that would help
someone who truly has a disability but not be desired by poten-
tial mimickers.
Second, some goods have public goods aspects in the sense
that they have benefits that are not excludible. That is, they may
generate positive externalities. The easiest case is curb cuts-one
person pays for a curb cut, others will get benefits. Other goods
may have similar effects. If so, cash transfers would mean under-
provision of these goods. In-kind provision or subsidies for these
goods would be desirable.
It is not clear which goods have these features.93 Public ar-
chitecture is the most obvious case. Changes to private architec-
ture may not because the owner of the structure might be able to
capture the benefits. There might, however, be network effects to
changing private architecture, which would create some positive
externalities not captured by the owners. Imagine a row of
stores, each considering making adjustments to become accessi-
ble to the disabled. If only a single store makes adjustments, but
there are fixed costs to the disabled to visiting the row of stores,
the adjustments might not attract new customers. If, however,
the whole row were accessible, the changes might be cost benefi-
cial. It is important to understand the extent to which goods
have public goods aspects or these types of externalities as it
bears on whether they should be provided in kind.
Third, there may be goods that are relatively inexpensive to
provide that cannot be readily purchased in the market (or only
purchased at a very high cost). In particular, the social model is
concerned with stigma. Stigma may reduce welfare, and provi-
93 Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 Georgetown L J 399 (2006) (exploring this issue in the mental health
context).
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sion of its near opposite, status, may improve welfare. Although
status can sometimes be purchased, it is difficult or expensive to
do so. Provision in-kind, through mere treatment of the disabled
as having equal status as others, may be inexpensive and yet
improve welfare dramatically. If so, a welfarist would support
such a policy. Thus, if we were going to redistribute $100 to
someone and they got more value out of $90 spent on reducing
stigma or increasing status, spending the $90 would save re-
sources.
In many cases, therefore, welfarist policies will coincide with
those associated with the social model. Unlike the social model,
however, there would be no presumption that in-kind provision is
more desirable. If helping someone through a direct transfer or
by providing medical care that reduces an impairment is cheaper
than in-kind provision (including costs and benefits, such as
stigma, screening, and other considerations), we should choose
the cheaper option. Thus, a welfarist approach can incorporate
the social model as an empirical claim that in-kind provision is
the cheaper method of redistribution.
B. Private Disability Insurance
If individuals can privately insure against disability, it
might be the case that the programs discussed here are not ne-
cessary. Individuals could, based on their risk preferences, decide
to insure or not. If they become disabled, private insurance
would provide the transfer mechanism instead of a government
program. One might argue that the possibility of private insur-
ance makes much of the discussion moot. While I cannot include
a complete discussion of the issue, there are three comments
worth making here.
First, the issue of public or private provision of social insur-
ance goes well beyond disability and includes retirement, income,
and health insurance. One can argue in all these cases that pub-
lic provision is not necessary. Nevertheless, public provision is
pervasive in developed countries. It is entirely appropriate to
discuss the design of a public program for disability without
answering such a fundamental question.
Second, the private purchase of insurance might be insuffi-
cient for a welfarist. The reason is that individuals would only
purchase insurance if their marginal utility of income is expected
to be higher when disabled. A welfarist (other than a utilitarian),
however, might care about absolute levels of welfare. Thus, a
welfarist might want to provide transfers to the disabled to re-
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duce inequality in absolute utility levels even if individuals
would not privately purchase insurance.
Finally, we do not have sufficient data to understand how a
private market would work. The data reflect some, but by no
means universal or particularly generous insurance coverage. 94
The key problem is that because of the numerous public pro-
grams, any data reflect the existence of the programs. Private
insurance might be crowded out. Thus, we cannot look at current
disability insurance programs to determine whether pure private
provision could work.
C. Additional Considerations
1. Observation versus autonomy.
As illustrated, observing a disability will often significantly
increase our ability to promote social policy toward the disabled
because it eliminates mimicking. Observation, therefore, is valu-
able, and investments in observation technology (such as diag-
nostic tools) may be socially worthwhile.
An opposing intuition is that government categorization is
intrusive, particularly to those concerned about autonomy. Po-
tentially significant benefits could depend on correct categoriza-
tion, giving bureaucrats real power. Similarly, one of the main
goals of the disability movement was for the disabled to be
treated as equals. Increased expenditures on observations may
be contrary to that goal. It is possible that something less than
the otherwise optimal investment in observation technology
would be optimal. 95
94 The data we have are collected by the Department of Labor. US Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in
Private Industry in the United States, Summary 04-04 (Mar 2004). In 2003, approximate-
ly 40 percent of workers were covered by a short-term disability plan and 30 percent by a
long-term disability plan. Id at 1. The numbers vary by wage rate, type of job (service,
white collar, or blue collar), and whether there was a union. Id at 2. According to earlier
(1987) data, the benefits were relatively low, with four-fifths of the plans providing 50 to
60 percent replacement of earnings. Diane B. Hill, Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Dis-
ability Insurance, 110 Monthly Lab Rev 16, 17 (1987). These plans may, however, also be
complemented by health plans, which would cover some of the costs of disability.
95 One response to the problem is that individuals who object to classification could
always choose not to get the relevant benefits. There is an aggregation problem. Suppose
that the government, with a classification scheme, could deliver one of two amounts $0 or
$100, depending on how individuals are classified. An individual not wishing to undergo
an exam could also choose to get $0. But suppose the alternative was that the government
did not classify and instead gave everyone $10. Someone who objects to the classification
scheme would not have the option of getting $10.
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A welfarist would value any reductions in autonomy only to
the extent individuals themselves are harmed. Autonomy has no
independent value. Therefore, we would try to trade-off the loss
of utility due to a government-imposed classification scheme with
the benefit of better targeting of disability benefits. The govern-
ment classifies all the time now. Most benefits and burdens im-
posed by the government have rules for qualifying, and it is not
clear that classifying the disabled would be more intrusive. Cur-
rent disability insurance benefits rely on elaborate classification
procedures.
2. Defining disabilities.
One of the features of a welfarist approach is that it allows
policy to be sensitive to differences among disabilities. There
may be administrative reasons for limiting policy to a few cate-
gories, but as a matter of pure theory, policy would be tailored to
different types of disabilities. That is, policy depends on precisely
how a disability affects utility, and if different disabilities affect
utility differently, different policies would be desirable. More
generally, a welfarist approach looks directly at utility functions
and uses disability as an intermediate category only as a cost
saving or administrability feature. There is no inherent defini-
tion of disabilities.
The relevant question in defining disability or different
types of disability is one of precision in legal rules. If there were
no cost to administering the rules, disability policy would be per-
fectly tailored. Given that there are costs, the question is one of
weighing an increase in precision against the increase in costs.
An important factor in such a balance is how different the poli-
cies would be, which depends on how different disabilities affect
welfare.
3. Endogenous disability.
So far, I have taken the number of disabled as given (al-
though I've assumed that the nondisabled may mimic the dis-
abled to get benefits or the disabled may pretend to have worse
disabilities than they actually do for similar reasons). The actual
number of disabilities, however, is likely to be endogenous to the
policies toward the disabled. Thus, more generosity toward the
disabled is, in effect, insurance against disability, reducing in-
centives to take care. This may be particularly true with the ma-
jor categories of disabilities in the United States today, chronic
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diseases. These may be much more within the control of individ-
uals than disabilities such as deafness or blindness. Endogeneity
may have important effects.
4. Additional public economics tools.
Once one starts approaching disability policy using the tools
of public economics, any number of possibilities become appar-
ent. For example, we might consider when to provide transfers
and whether and to what extent they should be phased out. We
can use the tools of public economics to determine when there
are subtle externalities that might require in-kind redistribution
or commodity subsidies. We have tools for determining when le-
gal regulation is the appropriate method of redistributing. As a
first attempt at applying tax and public economics theory to dis-
abilities, this Article cannot remotely explore many of these is-
sues. Hopefully, this Article is only a start.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of the discussion was (1) to illustrate that we need
a theory of distributive justice and not just the social model to
determine policy toward the disabled and (2) to illustrate how
welfarist theories would address the problem. The first point is
relatively clear, at least to me. The United States spends at least
$275 billion per year, and possibly much more, on disabilities.
Theories of discrimination are not sufficient to determine how
best to direct these massive resources. We must understand who
most needs the resources and how those individuals can be iden-
tified, as well as the cost to the rest of society of providing these
funds. Only a theory of distributive justice can handle these
tasks.
The analysis of welfarist approaches is, at best, preliminary,
and numerous issues need additional exploration. Nevertheless,
some key points are likely to remain. First, we must understand
how disability affects individuals. Research into hedonics has the
potential to help here, although existing studies are sufficiently
crude that we cannot yet draw firm conclusions. Second, identifi-
cation of the disabled may bring large benefits in terms of being
able to target resources and reduce screening problems. Finally,
provision of goods in-kind may be desirable in a variety of cir-
cumstances, which means that many of the recommendations of
the social model (which emphasizes in-kind provision) may carry
over to a welfarist approach.
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